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 Atheists and religious people alike find enough likeminded expression in Herman 
Melville’s major works to appropriate him as an icon of their beliefs. Melville’s 
biography and quotations appear on the websites for the Freedom From Religion 
Foundation, Positive Atheism Magazine, and the Freethought Almanac.1 He is also listed 
on the Wikipedia page of the bicentennial Unitarian Church of All Souls in New York as 
a notable member, while a prerecorded Melville-themed ‘walking tour’ of Manhattan—at 
one time accessible by scanning a QR code in the lobby of the New York Public 
Library—urges listeners to visit Trinity Church and climb up into the belfry as the author 
himself presumably had often done.2 
 Moby-Dick alone lends itself to myriad theological interpretations, inspiring book-
length works claiming it on behalf of everything from Calvinism to Hinduism and filling 
academic journals with proposed connections to Hebraism, Existentialism, Gnosticism, 
and more.3 Biographers and literary critics speculate on the influence in Melville’s life of 
                                                
 1 Annie Laurie Gaylor, “Herman Melville,” Freedom From Religion Foundation, accessed 
October 18, 2015, https://ffrf.org/news/day/dayitems/item/14487-herman-melville; “Positive Atheism’s Big 
List of Quotations,” Positive Atheism Magazine, accessed October 18, 2015, 
http://www.positiveatheism.org/hist/quotes/quote-m1b.htm; Ronald Bruce Meyer, “Herman Melville 
(1819),” Freethought Almanac, accessed October 18, 2015, http://freethoughtalmanac.com/?p=2788 
 
 2 “Unitarian Church of All Souls,” Wikipedia, accessed October 18, 2015, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unitarian_Church_of_All_Souls; Elizabeth Kray, “Walking Tour: Herman 
Melville’s Downtown New York City,” Poets.org, last modified June 27, 2006, 
https://www.poets.org/poetsorg/text/walking-tour-herman-melvilles-downtown-new-york-city 
 
 3 T. Walter Herbert, Moby Dick and Calvinism: A world Dismantled (Rutgers University Press, 
1977; H.B. Kulkarni, Moby-Dick: A Hindu Avatar (Boulder: Utah State University Press, 1970); Elisa 
New, “Bible Leaves! Bible Leaves! Hellenism and Hebraism in Melville’s Moby-Dick,” Poetics Today 19, 
no. 2 (Summer, 1998): 281-303; Ma Felisa López Liquete, “Melville, An Existentialist Humanist,” Revista 
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his baptism in the First Reformed Dutch Church, his mother’s Calvinist orthodoxy, his 
father’s Unitarianism, the strict Protestantism of his ancestors, and his famed encounters 
with Paganism that informed his earlier work. Yet for every word Melville wrote 
seemingly aligning himself with these religious and philosophical positions, he wrote 
another dozen words satirizing and indicting them. Melville’s ambiguity is at once his 
most frustrating and endearing quality for those who make pilgrimages to the farthest 
reaches of his vast, digressive prose. To that end, there is one more ‘ism’ deserving of a 
closer look in Melville’s major works: secular humanism.  
 In this essay, I intend to show that secular humanist ideals anchor Melville’s three 
major novels of the 1850’s—a moral constant amid his metaphysical and theological 
uncertainty and a worldview with which he engaged continually throughout his 
oscillation between belief and doubt. I argue that a measured and compromising approach 
to secular humanism is Melville’s alternative to the maddening search for ‘the absolute’ 
in nature or in humanity that plagued some of his well-known characters. I begin my 
pilgrimage with Melville’s quintessential humanist Ishmael in Moby Dick, contrasting 
Ishmael’s humanism and capacity for compromise with the individualism and absolutism 
of Ahab. Next, I examine Melville’s challenge to humanist idealism through the downfall 
of his eponymous protagonist in Pierre and through his disappointment with U.S. society 
as portrayed in The Confidence-Man. Before examining the rise and fall of secular 
humanist morality in these works, I begin with a brief overview of the religious landscape 
in which Melville was writing and then define all crucial terms.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
de Estudios Norteamericanos 1, no. 1 (1991): 49-57; Thomas Vargish, “Gnostic Mythos in Moby-Dick,” 
PMLA 81, no. 3 (Jun., 1966): 272-277. 
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The Rise of Secular Humanism in the United States 
 In the antebellum period, the United States was a landscape of religious crisis. 
The dizzying trend of denominational fragmentation generated an astounding number of 
new sects of Protestantism and related religions in the early nineteenth century. This 
landscape, which Brian LeBeau termed “a virtual breeding ground for new religions,” 
reached its peak in the Second Great Awakening between 1790 and 1860, culminating in 
a period of religious disorder, unrest, and inventiveness unequalled at any other in time in 
U.S. history.4 Often these new denominations owed their existence to doctrinal disputes, 
resulting in a plurality of Bible-believing sects each pioneered by reformers convinced of 
the rightness of their own biblical interpretation—a paradox of theological diversity and 
theological certainty that Melville frequently addresses and even ridicules in his work.5  
 Nathan Hatch argues that such denominational fragmentation reflected the fierce 
individualism fostered under the United States’ particular brand of democratic rhetoric 
and practice.6 Yet by this selfsame token of disunity, the core message of the faith, 
buffered as it may have been by its sectarian formulations, became more effective at 
transmitting Christianity throughout the culturally, ethnically, and economically diverse 
population of the United States. Perhaps the greatest irony of this period of religious 
revival, however, is that the mechanisms by which the message of Christianity spread 
virulently—the simplification of the Christian message into a few essential beliefs and 
                                                
 4 Brian F. LeBeau, Religion in America to 1865 (New York: NYU Press, 2000), 137. 
 
 5 For perspective, see Frank S. Mead’s classic reference Handbook of Denominations in the United 
States (Nashville: United Methodist Publishing House, 1951). The first edition lists 255 distinct 
denominations, many of which formed in the first half of the nineteenth century. Subsequent editions 
categorize these and more into at least twenty-two main families.   
 
 6 Nathan O. Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1989), 68. 
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the effective transmission of this essence via mass-printed evangelical tracts—have also 
been identified as vital to the rise of secularism in the antebellum United States.7 
 Secularism is the operation of civic duty and public life apart from or independent 
of religion, manifested in policies such as the separation of church and state. Nineteenth-
century secularism in the United States grew largely from religious rhetoric and belief. In 
order to reach a more diverse and widespread audience, evangelical tracts (a novel 
method for gospel transmission) whittled down complex theology into essential tenets of 
faith, such as urging readers toward Christian charity, moral goodness, and personal 
responsibility, which in their diluted form were as relevant to secular approaches to civil 
and social duty as to beliefs about personal salvation.8 Tracy Fessenden considers this 
emergence of secularism through the means of evangelical transmission, which she refers 
to as the “Protestant-secular continuum,” as the genesis of what became known as 
“American Civil Religion, a devotion to the nation’s sacred ideals that allegedly 
transcends denominational alliance.”9 Thus, the ideals of religious humanism and secular 
humanism in the antebellum United States were in many respects quite identical.  
 In this continuum between Protestant Christianity and secularism, and also from 
the denominational fragmentation of Protestantism, several forms of both religious and 
secular humanism began to emerge in the United States, including Unitarianism in New 
England. From this Unitarian tradition the humanist ideals with which Melville interacts 
                                                
 7 John Lardas Modern, Secularism in Antebellum America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011), 5. 
 8 Ibid. 
 
 9 Tracy Fessenden, Culture and Redemption: Religion, the Secular, and American Literature 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 140.  
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in his work, especially Moby Dick, begin to take the form of an organized humanist 
movement distinctive of “American”† democratic ideals and religious liberalism. 
Melville’s Unitarian Connection 
 The Unitarians were religious humanists who rose to prominence in intellectual 
circles in New England beginning in the eighteenth century. Unitarianism remained a 
relatively small denomination, but it nevertheless had a profound impact on literary 
production in the antebellum era, particularly in New England; for example, Lawrence 
Buell finds that “fully half of the region’s writers who might arguably be called ‘major’” 
were Unitarians at some point in their lives.10 Daniel Walker Howe considers Harvard 
Unitarianism to have been a necessary philosophical stepping-stone between orthodox 
Christianity and the religious liberalism of New Englanders like Ralph Waldo Emerson 
and Henry David Thoreau: “Such Transcendentalists as these could never have written 
their splendid paeans to individualism if the Unitarians had not paved the way for them 
by destroying Calvinistic doctrines of original sin.”11 While the philosophy of Emerson 
and other religious liberals in the United States eventually led them to renounce all 
                                                
 † The term “American” appears in quotation marks to indicate its usage as an ideological 
construction rather than as a rigid geographical designator. The term, as used in Melville’s work and that of 
many of his critics, refers primarily to an identity assumed by people from the United States, rather than as 
a proper term for the roughly 1 billion people throughout the Western Hemisphere with an equal historical 
and geographical claim to the title “American.” All first-hand instances of this term and its variations 
(including reference to the United States as “America”) will indicate the former meaning, as indicated by 
the continued use of quotation marks.  
 
 10 Lawrence Buell, “The Literary Significance of the Unitarian Movement,” in American 
Renaissance, edited by Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House, 2004), 241-258, 242. Buell 
acknowledges that the impact of Unitarianism on literature has been exaggerated in the literary ‘canon,’ 
which almost exclusively inducted works by white males mainly from New England, while overlooking 
works from women, minority writers, and southern writers. Nevertheless, Buell finds that Unitarianism’s 
literary impact in a broader context is still notably “disproportionate to its size” (242).  
  
 11 Daniel Walker Howe, The Unitarian Conscience: Harvard Moral Philosophy 1805-1861 
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 10. 
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organized religion, other Transcendentalist figures, such as Theodore Parker, operated 
within organized religion and often in the Unitarian church.12  
 These liberal religious movements, which de-emphasized the role of God and the 
supernatural and encouraged a positive view of innate human morality and potential, 
fused together with Enlightenment ideals of reason to form much of the basis for modern 
secular humanism.13 Thus, nineteenth-century Unitarianism in New England was in part a 
transitional component in the development of modern secular humanism, and was at the 
productive center of moral thought in the United States. It is partly through Unitarianism 
that Melville encountered these humanist ideals that he embraces, challenges, and 
fiercely questions throughout his major works.  
 In February 1850, largely due to the Unitarian affiliations of his wife Elizabeth, 
Melville enrolled in the Unitarian Church of All Souls in New York City in the middle of 
the forty-six year ministerial tenure of Henry Whitney Bellows.14 Notably, Bellows is 
responsible for the oft-misattributed epigram, “God has no religion.”15 While it is safe to 
assume that Melville made little more than the required occasional visit, there are echoes 
of Bellows’ Unitarian doctrine and oratory style in some of his theologizing and 
philosophizing characters, including Plotinus Plinlimmon in Pierre.16 Such indicators 
                                                
 12 Ibid. 
 13 For a brief overview of humanism and its ties to Transcendentalism, liberal Christianity, and the 
Enlightenment, see Harvard’s Pluralism Project. http://www.pluralism.org/religion/humanism/belief. 
 
 14 Herschel Parker, Herman Melville: A Biography, Volume 2, 1851-1891 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002), 65-66. 
 
 15 Henry Whitney Bellows, Re-statements of Christian Doctrine, In Twenty-Five Sermons (Boston: 
American Unitarian Association, 1867), 149, accessed September 25, 2015, https://ia600407.us.archive.org 
/15/items/restatementschr05bellgoog/restatementschr05bellgoog.pdf. 
 
16 For example, Bellows uses a nautical navigation metaphor to demonstrate the benefit of 
doctrinal relativism over fundamentalism, and does so as part of his series subtitled “In Twenty-Five 
Sermons” (see previous citation). Similarly, in Pierre, Plinlimmon uses a nautical timekeeping metaphor to 
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suggest that Melville at the very least engaged enough with the ideas of the Unitarian 
influences in his life to respond to them in his work, even if he was at best infrequently 
involved in All Souls and remained largely unconvinced by their doctrine.  
 Despite Melville’s doubts about Unitarianism that persisted throughout his years 
of membership in All Souls and his social involvement in the largely Unitarian literary 
and philosophical scene in New England and New York, he nonetheless supported a 
number of the distinct (and at the time controversial) positions held by proponents of the 
Unitarian movement beginning in the 1830s in the era David Miano characterizes as the 
“Transcendentalist Stage” of Unitarianism in the United States.17 Such positions included 
the turning away from the idea of scripture as infallible, the reconfiguring of scriptural 
interpretation according to democratic individualism, and the universalizing of the moral 
responsibility of good will toward others. 
 Many Unitarians posited that biblical scripture, while full of potential revelations 
of God, was not the infallible word of God. In his highly influential 1836 lectures “The 
Rationale of Religious Inquiry,” English Unitarian James Martineau demands that even 
scripture must yield to reason and subject itself to humankind’s increasing understanding 
of the natural world: “Reason is the ultimate appeal, the supreme tribunal, to which the 
test of even Scripture must be brought.”18 Such rationalist readings, unlike previous 
                                                                                                                                            
demonstrate the benefit of pursuing practical virtue rather than unattainable Christian perfection, and does 
so as part of his series subtitled “In Three Hundred and Thirty-Three Lectures” (Pierre 210-215).   
 17 David Miano, “The Development of American Unitarian Theology,” American Unitarian 
Conference, 2006, accessed November 1, 2015, http://www.americanunitarian.org/mianotheology.htm 
 
 18 James Martineau, The Rationale of Religious Inquiry (London: J. Chapman, 1845), 64, accessed 
February 26, 2016, https://ia902606.us.archive.org/5/items/rationalereligi00whitgoog/rationalereligi00whit 
goog.pdf. For an overview of Unitarian rationalism in which Martineau was writing and lecturing, see 
Joseph Henry Allen, A History of the Unitarians and the Universalists in the United States (New York: 
Christian Literature, 1894), 146-169, accessed September 20, 2015, https://ia700402.us.archive.org/8/items/ 
historyofunitari00alle/historyofunitari00alle.pdf. 
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skeptical assessments of scripture that focused exclusively on challenging miraculous 
claims in the Old Testament, reorganized Unitarian attitudes toward the New Testament 
as well, deemphasizing the miraculous aspects of the gospels and focusing instead on the 
works and teachings of Jesus as the example of a moral life.19 Secular humanists, having 
distinguished themselves from Unitarians in the mid-1900s, continued to uphold the 
works and teachings of the biblical Jesus as moral exemplars despite self-consciously 
severing religious ties altogether.  
 Unlike Secular Humanists, Unitarians remained committed to scripture; however, 
in contrast to other sects of Protestantism that were founded on theological certainty, 
Unitarians both recognized and encouraged diverse and individualized interpretations of 
scripture, promoting whichever interpretations were most accessible. “There is no 
universal and unchanging language for metaphysical ideas [such as those central to 
Christian sectarian doctrine],” John Hamilton Thom insists in an 1839 lecture, 
“[however], the symbols of language that reveal the living Jesus are of universal 
significance, and finding their way at once to every heart, stamp upon it a faithful image 
of the Christ.”20 Such redefining of humanity’s relationship to biblical truth echoes 
William Ellery Channing’s 1819 Baltimore Sermon—a lecture credited with first 
articulating the theological principles of Unitarianism, leading to the formation of the 
                                                
 19 For a famous example, see The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth, compiled around 1820 by 
Thomas Jefferson. In this book, often referred to as the ‘Jefferson Bible,’ Jefferson compiled numerous 
passages of the New Testament, particularly the doctrine and teachings of Jesus Christ, while omitting 
supernatural elements such as miracles and prophecy. Jefferson referred to himself variously as a deist and 
a Unitarian, although his religious beliefs in his writings more closely associate him with Unitarianism. See 
Michael Corbett et al, Politics and Religion in the United States (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1999), 63. 
 
 20 John Hamilton Thom, “Christianity Not the Property of Critics and Scholars; But the Gift of 
God to All Men,” John Hamilton Thom, James Martineau, and Henry Giles, Unitarianism Defended 
(London: Kinder, 1839), accessed October 25, 2015, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/49930/49930-
h/49930-h.htm. 
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Unitarian denomination in 1825. Channing assures, “We regard the Scriptures as the 
records of God’s successive revelation to mankind… Whatever doctrines seem to us to be 
clearly taught in the Scriptures, we receive without reserve or exception.”21  
 Unitarianism, then, sought to establish moral credibility in humanity based on the 
democratic principle of individualism, trusting individuals to interpret doctrine in a way 
that would orient them toward moral behavior and stressing the equal accessibility of 
moral truth to all. In a treatise of Unitarianism, Minot Judson Savage urges, “Have faith, 
then, in the people… faith in their healthy instincts, faith in their general sanity, faith in 
their desire for the right and the true.”22 In this way, Unitarianism—as it was presented to 
Melville—contained many aspects of the core doctrine of secular humanism, in that it 
promoted the reorientation of humanity away from supernatural commitments and toward 
a universally accessible moral responsibility for goodwill.  
Melville and the Humanist Manifestos 
 Secular humanism came into vogue in the twentieth century, as Darwinian 
evolution worked alongside the technological advances of modernization to support 
beliefs that the universe is self-existent and that humankind has infinite potential. 
Melville’s three major novels of the 1850’s—Moby Dick, Pierre, and The Confidence-
Man—all predated the publication of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of the Species in 
1859 as well as the literature of organized secular humanism from the 1900s; however, 
Darwin was far from being the first to propose a theory of natural systems or biological 
                                                
 21 William Ellery Channing, “Unitarian Christianity,” American Unitarian Conference, May 5, 
1819, accessed November 1, 2015. http://www.americanunitarian.org/unitarianchristianity.htm (emphasis 
added). 
 
 22 Minot J. Savage, Our Unitarian Gospel (Boston: G.H. Ellis, 1898), accessed September 20, 
2015, http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/18578/pg18578-images.html (emphasis added).  
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origins not necessarily reliant on supernaturalism, and twentieth-century secular 
humanists were not pioneers of a new philosophy so much as organizers and articulators 
of existing modes of thinking. Both the metaphysical implications that can be drawn from 
Darwinian evolution and the principal tenets of secular humanism were available to 
Melville in one form or another from other tributaries of philosophical inquiry and 
scientific thought. Thus, while Melville may have no connection to the institutions of 
secular humanism that culminated nearly fifty years after his death, his work nevertheless 
engages secular humanism’s core beliefs. 
 The core beliefs of secular humanism are perhaps most straightforwardly 
presented in the Humanist Manifesto of 1933 and subsequent versions in 1973 and 2003. 
Written by Raymond Bragg with other contributors, the first Humanist Manifesto was 
signed by thirty-four prominent humanist intellectuals and community leaders around the 
United States, including fifteen Unitarian ministers and leaders. The authors, despite 
many of them being members of the religious humanist movement and utilizing familiar 
Unitarian rhetoric, unmistakably advocate for secular humanism and focus primarily on 
activities and attitudes of human significance.23 They criticize the identification of the 
word religion with “doctrines and methods,” which they believe have “lost their 
significance and which are powerless to solve the problem of human living in the 
Twentieth Century.”24 They propose instead that religion is simply any “means for 
realizing the highest values of life.”25 
                                                
 23 Richard Cimino and Christopher Smith, "Secular Humanism and Atheism beyond Progressive 
Secularism," Sociology Of Religion 68, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 407-424.  
 
 24 Kurtz, Paul, ed. Humanist Manifestos I and II (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1973), 7. 
 
 25 Ibid. 
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 Subsequent secular humanists, aiming to disassociate completely from their 
religious humanist roots (as well as curb the Humanist Manifesto’s unbridled optimism 
about science and social progress in light of the atrocities of the Holocaust, the nuclear 
bombing of Japan, Cold War era “doomsday scenarios,” and so on) drafted the Humanist 
Manifesto II in 1973, which purges all of the former associations with religious 
humanism and declares a more self-consciously secular worldview on behalf of 
organized secular humanism.26 A third manifesto largely restates and simplifies the core 
theses of the preceding documents in 2003. Together, these three texts articulate a secular 
humanist worldview that largely materialized in Melville’s lifetime and of which his 
philosophy was prototypical in the 1850s.   
 Secular humanism can be defined by the sum of its parts. First, secularism does 
not necessarily require a commitment to a naturalistic or atheistic worldview; rather, the 
term ‘secular’ refers to attitudes, beliefs, ideologies, and practices that pertain to things 
not spiritual or divine, or at least to things that do not depend upon the spiritual or divine 
in order to operate in the world. Within this framework, secular humanism establishes 
human morality as ontologically independent; that is, human goodness does not depend 
for its existence upon the existence of God, whether or not God does indeed exist.  
 Humanism, in accordance with the three manifestos, is a commitment to “the 
positive belief in the possibilities of human progress,” a preservation of “the best ethical 
teachings in the religious traditions of humankind,” a rejection of those teachings that 
“deny humans a full appreciation of their own potentialities and responsibilities,” and a 
                                                
 26 Ibid., 14.  
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concern for the well being of all people in pursuit of the “enhancement of human life.”27 
Moreover, the humanist finds “brotherhood”† or social unity to be the peak of human 
experience, kindness to be the greatest virtue, and fulfillment of human personality and 
potential to be the highest goal.28 Each of these ideals and others from the humanist 
manifestos are embedded in the philosophical conscience of Melville’s work, beginning 
with his idealized secular humanist Ishmael in Moby Dick and echoing through his major 
novels of the 1850s.  
                                                
 27 Ibid., 1-31. 
 
 † Despite using the gendered term “brotherhood,” the authors (presumably) meant to include 
human beings of all genders in their conception of fellowship, community, or camaraderie. One may note, 
however, that women were excluded from the creation and signing of the manifestos and from the initial 
formation and leadership of organized secular humanism. The American Humanist Association has since 
compiled a commendable record of supporting women’s rights, has made progress in involving women in 
leadership positions, and has recognized more than a dozen women with the Humanist of the Year Award 
(est. 1953). Nevertheless, all first-hand uses of the terms “brotherhood” and “brotherly love” appear in 
quotations as a reminder of this history of paternalism and gender exclusion.  
 
 28 Ibid. 






Chapter I: Ishmael, Secular Humanist 
 
 Although Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Gay Science (1882) and its most famous 
epigram, Gott ist tot, were not published until three decades after Moby-Dick; or, The 
Whale (1851), the philosopher was referring to a cultural shift that he believed had 
already occurred even before the turn of the nineteenth century, based on his observations 
of radical changes in human life and thought.29 Philosophers and literary critics still 
debate the meaning of Nietzsche’s epigram on the death of God, but there is at least some 
consensus that he was referring to the Judeo-Christian God’s role in Western culture 
being changed or diminished. As Sean Kelly puts it, “[God] no longer plays his 
traditional social role of organizing us around a commitment to a single right way to 
live.”30 While Moby Dick offers numerous problems to anyone who infers that the author 
possesses a strictly atheistic worldview, Melville’s masterpiece is more compatible with 
this weaker claim of God’s altered role in Western society.  
 In support of this claim, the characters of Moby Dick symbolically deconstruct a 
whale, yet they do so in an unceremonious and utilitarian fashion. By conquering 
Leviathan and stripping it bare for practical use, the crew of the Pequod—Melville’s 
microcosm of humanity—rises to God’s challenge to his faithful victim Job.31 Lawrance 
Thompson correlates the step-by-step dismantling and utilizing of the body of an old, sick 
                                                
 29 Sean D. Kelly, “Navigating Past Nihilism,” The New York Times (New York, NY), Dec. 5, 
2010. http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/navigating-past-nihilism/ 
 
 30 Ibid. 
 
 31 Job 41:1-34 (King James Bible) 
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whale with God’s “taunting insistence that Leviathan is inscrutable and untouchable,” 
finding the crew’s thoroughness in putting every possible part of the whale to some sort 
of human-serving (and, in the case of the ‘Cassock,’ smugly sacrilegious) use to be a 
sarcastic method by which Melville ridicules “the orthodox Christian dogma that the 
Holy Bible is the infallible Word of God.”32 Despite this dismantling of Leviathan, the 
unconquered Moby Dick—a beacon of ambiguity, according to Ishmael, and the key to 
metaphysical truth, according to Ahab—continues to elude understanding. The dissection 
of the old, sick whale, symbolic of Nietzsche’s culturally diminished Judeo-Christian 
God and his gospel, does not infer the non-existence of divinity or things beyond our 
understanding. It does, however, challenge the infallibility of the gospel and 
Christendom’s understanding of God.  
 Both Ishmael and Ahab face an ontological crisis, but the two characters develop 
drastically opposing strategies to navigate this uncertainty. Ishmael combines his 
humanist ideals with a crucial ability to compromise, which empowers him to accept the 
limits of human understanding, to deal with ambiguity, and to recognize the finite nature 
of humanity, all the while striving to foster the unity of humankind. Ahab, whose first 
encounter with Moby Dick instills him with unanswerable questions about fate and the 
nature of reality, suppresses his own humanist drive in his effort to discover an 
absolute—some unchangeable and self-existent feature of the world, particularly the 
confirmed existence or non-existence of fate or divinity—and he prioritizes the 
sovereignty of the individual over the well being of the community.   
 
                                                
 32 Lawrance Thompson, Melville’s Quarrel With God (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1952), 214. 
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Ishmael’s Humanist Conversion 
 Ishmael’s worldview is founded on a personal religious tradition, but this tradition 
fails to satisfy his innate desire for human connection. Before boarding the Pequod, 
Ishmael, a soul-searcher attempting to stave off suicidal thoughts by going to sea, attends 
a sermon by renowned minister Father Mapple. First, the image of Father Mapple’s 
church is bleak in its complete lack of fellowship. The congregation is made up of “silent 
islands of men and women” scattered around the pews, with “each silent worshipper… 
purposely sitting apart from the other, as if each silent grief were insular and 
incommunicable.”33 All persons present (except for Queequeg, unable to interpret the 
written language) are solemnly contemplating marble tablets that bear memorials of 
sailors and ships lost at sea, which seem to “gnaw upon all Faith” and cause “old wounds 
[to] bleed afresh” (MD, 41). During the sermon, Father Mapple is distant and 
impregnable in his nautically themed pulpit during the sermon and casts woe upon those 
who are “castaways” (MD, 54). Afterwards, he covers his face in his hands and drops to 
his knees in silence until he is “left all alone in the place” (MD, 54). This dynamic of 
isolation is recreated in the social environment of the Pequod, as Captain Ahab spends 
much of the beginning of the voyage impregnable in his quarters, while the crew is 
comprised of “nearly all Isolatoes… not acknowledging a common continent of men, but 
each Isolato living on a separate continent of his own” (MD, 131). 
 Furthermore, the content of Father Mapple’s sermon, in which the famed minister 
recounts the biblical story of Jonah in dramatic detail and with gripping oratorical power, 
includes no attempt to unify the island-like members of his congregation, but rather 
                                                
 33 Herman Melville, Moby-Dick; or, The Whale (New York: Penguin, 2003), 39. Subsequent 
references will be to this edition by page number and the abbreviation MD.  
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condemns and ultimately disappoints. In his introduction to the sermon, Father Mapple 
remarks that the book of Jonah, despite being at four chapters one of the “smallest strands 
in the mighty cable of the Scriptures,” is nevertheless the “boisterously grand” bearer of a 
“pregnant lesson” that reaches remarkable “depths of the soul” (MD, 47). Such promises 
are not delivered upon as, despite the narrative mastery with which he recounts the story 
of Jonah, Father Mapple’s analysis delivers little more than a basic Calvinist message: 
“Sin not; but if you do… repent” (MD, 52). Even the blessings at the end of the sermon, 
which Father Mapple delivers with “deep joy in his eyes,” depict God as disciplinary: 
“Eternal delight” to him who “can say with his final breath—O Father!—Chiefly known 
to me by Thy rod—mortal or immortal, here I die” (MD, 52; emphasis added). Ishmael’s 
most direct interaction with Protestant Christianity in the novel, therefore, is a solemn 
encounter with isolation, grief, disappointment, guilt, and mortality.  
 Upon leaving Father Mapple’s chapel and reuniting with the pagan Queequeg at 
the Spouter-Inn, Ishmael experiences a sort of conversion brought about by breaking the 
isolation of the “lonely room” and interacting with his once and future bedfellow: “I felt a 
melting in me. No more my splintered heart and maddened hand were turned against the 
wolfish world. This Soothing savage had redeemed it” (MD, 57). Ishmael’s conversion is 
not a religious experience but a human experience, which causes him to adjust his 
priorities and reject his former prejudices, evidenced by his choice to “try a pagan 
friend… since Christian kindness has proved a hollow courtesy” (MD, 57). When 
signaled by Queequeg to join him in worship of an idol, Ishmael weighs his upbringing in 
the “infallible” Presbyterian Church (and presumably the reverberant message of sin and 
repentance from Father Mapple’s sermon) against his desire and emerging priority for 
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human connection and fellowship. Ishmael finds it impossible that the “magnanimous 
God of heaven and earth—pagans and all included” could be jealous of a small wooden 
idol, and he redefines worship as doing the will of God—specifically God’s will to 
uphold the ‘Golden Rule’ espoused in the teachings of Jesus Christ, which Ishmael 
paraphrases as the will to “do to my fellow man what I would have my fellow man do to 
me” (MD, 58). Because Ishmael would have Queequeg would join him in his own 
Presbyterian form of worship, he concludes via application of this Golden Rule that he 
therefore ought to “turn idolater” to fulfill the will of God (MD, 58). 
 Ishmael’s decision is partly a weighing of Old Testament commandments, which 
forbid idolatry, against New Testament teachings of Jesus Christ, which encourage above 
all else love for God and love for others; however, Ishmael’s new evaluation of morality 
is also an adoption of humanist priorities above religious doctrine. Despite his 
demonstrated familiarity with the Old Testament and therein his implied knowledge of its 
depiction of the Judeo-Christian God as a jealous God, Ishmael reinterprets scripture 
based on what he perceives to be a higher guiding principle of human kindness and 
decides that God’s call to love others is more important than keeping the commandments. 
Emphasizing this dilemma is the history of Ishmael’s own Presbyterianism, which at its 
Calvinist roots has an especially vigilant history of opposing idolatry through 
iconoclasm—the physical destruction of icons, statues, and other revered objects—even 
to the point of committing violence against other Christians to combat what they believed 
to be idolatrous religious practice.34 Given the weight of this decision, Ishmael’s choice to 
worship Queequeg’s idol at the expense of doctrinal obedience is significant because it 
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signals his embrace of an emerging humanist ideal within himself as he rejects Father 
Mapple’s charge to ‘sin not’ in order to requite Queequeg’s “brotherly love.”  
 Furthermore, Ishmael rejects Father Mapple’s definition of the will of God—that 
“we must disobey ourselves” in order to “obey God” and follow his commands—and 
prioritizes his capacity for positive human experience above doctrinal responsibility (MD, 
48). Therein, Ishmael preempts the writers of the Humanist Manifesto II, who accept the 
teachings of religion only insofar as they promote human well being, while condemning 
religious activities or beliefs that “place revelation, God, ritual, or creed above human 
needs and experience” and perform “a disservice to the human species” by inhibiting 
humans from “helping themselves or experiencing their full potentialities.”35 The 
inhibitions of guilt and condemnation are relinquished then in Ishmael’s pursuit of a 
human connection that would allow him to experience his full potential as part of a 
“loving pair” with Queequeg (MD, 58). As a result of his humanist conversion, Ishmael is 
redeemed—that is, his connection with Queequeg offers him a chance to break free from 
his own status as an Isolato and achieve fellowship in a way that was evidently 
unavailable to the members of Father Mapple’s congregation. Thus, Ishmael decisively 
abandons religious dogma to act in a way that promotes human unity, demonstrates love 
for self and others, values the human need for companionship, and allows him to 
experience his full potential by bringing him out of his insulating prejudice and isolation.  
Ishmael’s Declaration of Faith 
 Following this conversion from fundamentalist religious commitment, Ishmael 
adopts the rhetoric of humanism in his own declaration of faith, preaching tolerance, 
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acceptance, and unity to dismantle the prejudices of others. As Ishmael and Queequeg 
approach the Pequod, Captains Bildad and Peleg confront them, identifying Queequeg as 
a “son of darkness” and a “Philistine” and referring to his many tattoos of “devil’s blue” 
as a sign that he has not been “baptized right” (MD, 96-97). The captains command the 
pair to present documentation proving Queequeg’s religious conversion—symbolic of 
assimilation into the United States’ mainstream religious and cultural values—in order to 
prove his eligibility to board the ship. In response to the captains’ prejudices against and 
suspicions of Queequeg, Ishmael acts on behalf of his newfound humanism by exercising 
rhetoric familiar to Unitarianism. He wards off the captains’ charges by appealing to the 
common ground of membership in “the same ancient Catholic Church” to which “all of 
us, and every mother’s son and soul belong; the great and everlasting First Congregation 
of this whole worshipping world” (MD, 96-97). Certainly this declaration, which Ishmael 
improvises to escape being caught in an equivocation, is not without notes of sarcasm; 
however, his appeals are sincere enough to persuade, if not proselytize, the captains to 
accept Queequeg as he is, paganism and all.  
 Ishmael’s declaration of faith departs from Father Mapple’s sermon in two crucial 
ways. First, Ishmael embraces Queequeg’s religious and cultural difference, whereas 
Father Mapple’s sermon finds no room to reconcile Queequeg’s own demonstrations of 
communal love with the impossibility for his salvation on account of his devout 
paganism. Secondly, Ishmael values Queequeg’s humanist qualities above his religious 
affiliations, whereas Father Mapple demands unflinching commitment to the “truth” and 
condemns “disobedience of the command of God” (MD, 47-54). Father Mapple is 
someone who believes that he “knows exactly… who God is [and] what he expects” from 
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human beings, Brian Yothers observes, so his message of divine certainty stands in 
contrast to Ishmael’s promotion of religious difference throughout the novel.36 Ishmael’s 
point, Yothers argues, exposes Melville’s sense of “universal human communion that 
transcends racial, cultural, and religious difference.”37 Such acceptance of religious 
difference is familiar to readers of Melville’s earlier works, particularly Typee (1846), as 
the author frequently interacts with the concept of the ‘noble savage,’ or the notion that 
‘primitive’ people are more pure or virtuous because they live free from the corrupting 
influence of civilization.38 Even though Melville never affirms the truth of the conception 
of the ‘noble savage,’ his engagement with the idea demonstrates his willingness to 
consider members of other religions and cultures for their merits, while his overt 
condemnation of Christian missionaries and their evangelical tactics shows his resistance 
to the project of global religious and cultural homogenization.  
 Although he offers no declaration of his own, Queequeg’s own humanist instinct 
appears to match Ishmael’s. Susan McWilliams observes that Queequeg “thinks 
differently about interdependence” than his crewmates, and that this positive difference is 
apparent in his unhesitating action to save a drowning man, his comfortable dependence 
on Ishmael when connected by a lifeline, and his willingness to rely on others, especially 
the carpenter who makes his coffin for him, when ailing nearly to the point of death.39 
Queequeg’s ability to depend on others without humiliation sets him apart from the 
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“American” crewmembers and particularly Captain Ahab, McWilliams determines, 
because he is not indoctrinated into the isolating effects of capitalistic individualism and 
instead embodies an attitude characterized by embrace of human community and 
interdependence.40  
 By this interpretation, Ishmael’s declaration is not only a device to persuade the 
captains to adopt religious toleration, but also a genuine expression of belonging to a 
unified humanity that transcends cultural and religious boundaries, and by assigning 
Queequeg the venerable role of Deacon in this ancient church of the “whole worshipping 
world,” Ishmael praises the genuine humanist spirit with which his friend is inherently 
endowed (MD, 455-456). Thus, the captains concede Ishmael’s humanist appeals despite 
the fact that Queequeg is not a member of the congregation of Deacon Deuteronomy—a 
significant name, as the book of Deuteronomy contains a charge from Moses to the 
Israelites urging them to observe the law of God and imposing upon them the need for 
exclusive allegiance to the Judeo-Christian God.41 Ishmael’s declaration abhors the 
rejection of Queequeg based on his non-allegiance to the Judeo-Christian God and 
submits his membership in humanity as his essential quality.   
Ishmael’s Communion 
 In one of the most significant passages in Moby Dick, Ishmael and other 
crewmates are assigned the task of dissolving lumps of aromatic spermaceti from a 
recently killed whale to keep the substance from solidifying before it can be processed. 
The oily substance is pleasantly aromatic (like the “smell of spring violets”) and it softens 
and moisturizes Ishmael’s hands as he methodically finds “soft, gentle globules” and 
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squeezes them back into liquid (MD, 455-456). Following the “bitter exertion” of the 
whale-hunt, this task becomes a means by which Ishmael experiences a sort of 
transcendence that empties him of “ill-will, or petulance, or malice, of any sort 
whatsoever” and allows him to baptize himself and wash his hands and heart of the 
“horrible oath” to pursue Moby Dick (MD, 455-456). Following this baptism, Ishmael 
actively partakes in a ceremonial manifestation of the universal communion alluded to in 
his declaration as he mistakenly squeezes his crewmates’ hands in search of the globules: 
Such an abounding, affectionate, friendly, loving, feeling did this avocation beget; 
that at last I was continually squeezing their hands, and looking up into their eyes 
sentimentally; as much to say,—Oh! my dear fellow beings, why should we 
longer cherish any social acerbities, or know the slightest ill-humor or envy! 
Come; let us all squeeze hands all round, nay, let us all squeeze ourselves into 
each other; let us squeeze ourselves universally into the very milk and sperm of 
kindness (MD, 455-456). 
 
  Critics have been quick to acknowledge the masturbatory and homoerotic 
implications of this passage, particularly Melville’s punning on the word ‘sperm,’ while 
others interpret Ishmael’s stated desire for universal human convergence to be an instance 
of satirized idealism or playful irony.42 Despite this analytical focus on the innuendo and 
ironic tone, most readers still find Ishmael’s call to unity and message of communal love 
to be an authentic gesture: Howard P. Vincent finds this scene to be a crucial balance 
between the “isolato theme” and the “companionship theme;” Debra J. Rosenthal reads 
the passage as a sentimental appeal employed as part of a larger strategy for encouraging 
unity and thus salvation; Kristen Boudreau considers the act of squeezing “into each 
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other” to be universalist “homogenizing” of humans into a transcendent fellowship.43 
Some in-depth analyses reconcile both the overt and covert meanings by identifying a 
single goal, such as Robert Shulman’s examination, which finds that by couching a 
message of universal “brotherly love” in the language of “deviant sexuality,” Ishmael 
manages to affirm his “Christian brotherhood” while simultaneously conveying his 
rejection of the social norms policed by Protestant society.44  
 Whether or not the subversive features of this passage are central to its purpose or 
merely serve as comic relief between the darker passages preceding (Pip being lost at sea 
and going mad) and following (a demonic portrait of the Pequod and near capsizing of 
the ship by Ishmael), Ishmael’s actions and expressions both motivate and support his 
call for universal unity and kindness and thus represent Ishmael at the highest watermark 
of his “attainable felicity” and at the peak of his humanist sentiment (MD, 456). This 
communion establishes Ishmael’s ability to break free from his status as an isolato—not 
only as part of a ‘loving pair’ with Queequeg, but also as part of a greater, all-inclusive 
fellowship with the diverse crew of the Pequod. While squeezing the hands of his 
shipmates, Ishmael joins the fellowship referred to in his own declaration on the universal 
communion of all people: “in that we all join hands” (MD, 97; emphasis in the original).  
Ahab and the ‘Sovereignty of Self’ 
 Individualism as a principle for independence and self-reliance is an emergent 
product of “American” rhetoric and democratic ideals in the United States, culminating in 
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a culture that precipitates personal isolation. Robert D. Putnam finds that individualism 
consistently outweighs community in the political hagiology of the United States, noting 
that liberation from community bonds is an honored theme in United States culture, that 
the United States’ national myths “often exaggerate the role of individual heroes and 
understate the importance of collective effort,” and that this reverence for “rugged 
individualism” persists in contemporary literature, film, and politics.45 Despite the 
community-building role that churches, mosques, synagogues, temples, and other 
religious organizations play in the United States, this culture of individualism pervades 
religious rhetoric and practice as well as shapes civic life. Melville captures this aspect of 
“American” religion in the sermon of Father Mapple, who delivers a message of 
individualism to the Isolatoes in his congregation: “Delight is to him… who against the 
proud gods and commodores of this earth, ever stands forth his own inexorable self.”46 
 Humanism in the United States is not exempt from this culture of individualism, 
as it remains highly concerned with the democratic freedom and wellbeing of the 
individual; however, humanism’s emphasis on fulfilling a universal goal of fellowship 
distinguishes it from ‘rugged individualism’ as a guiding principle for social and civic 
interaction. Many critics have noted this contrast between humanism and individualism in 
Melville’s work. McWilliams finds this contrast to be the basis of Melville’s criticism of 
the individualistic ideals of Transcendentalism: “The picture that Melville draws of 
American citizens in Moby-Dick is a kind of Emersonian paradise… a society in which 
individual insulation is the standard mode of being,” but which in Melville’s portrayal is 
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“deeply problematic.”47 Similarly, Ray Browne, in his well-known exploration of 
humanist themes in Melville’s work, considers the central theme of Moby Dick to be the 
conflict between the individual and the mass, with Ishmael’s humanism representing the 
latter.48 If Ishmael represents the ideal of community, Ahab is the prime candidate to 
represent the ideal of individualism. 
 Ahab’s own ‘inexorable self’ and his obsession with transcending the limits of 
human capabilities together culminate in a sort of Promethean sense of self. In a letter to 
Nathaniel Hawthorne, Melville himself advances this interpretation of Ahab, explaining, 
“He may perish; but so long as he exists, he insists upon treating with all Powers upon an 
equal basis.”49 Thompson elaborates this Promethean quality, attributing to Ahab an 
attitude that “[glorifies] in its own divine attributes so persistently” that “no… God-
bullying could ever impair the sovereignty of self.”50 Ahab may delight in the best 
features of humankind, but to achieve his individualist goal, he dominates the will of the 
crew and thus rejects the communal goals of humanism.  
 Ahab is not without his own humanist instincts, but his drive for individualism 
overpowers his desire for human connection. Ahab confronts a symbolic opportunity for 
human connection similar to that of Ishmael’s ‘communion’ when, right before beginning 
the three-day chase of Moby Dick, Ahab draws Starbuck near to him: “Starbuck; let me 
look into a human eye; it is better than to gaze into sea or sky; better than to gaze upon 
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God” (MD, 591-592). Despite presenting himself with the opportunity to abandon his 
individualistic drive and embrace Starbuck’s offer to return to his wife and child, Ahab 
instead turns away, questioning the “nameless, inscrutable, unearthly thing” that 
commands him in his monomaniacal quest and makes him “do what in [his] own proper, 
natural heart [he] durst not so much as dare,” leading him to question, “Is Ahab, Ahab?” 
(MD, 591-592). Here Ahab examines his self-alienation in words similar to those of Paul 
of Tarsus in the book of Romans: “For that which I do I allow not… but what I hate, that 
I do.”51 Ahab loathes but, because of his fierce individualism, cannot leave the 
“desolation of solitude” that has made him “more demon than man” and keeps him 
pushing against “all natural lovings and longings” for human connection (MD, 590-592). 
 Thus individualism, here an opposing ideology to Ishmael’s humanism, drives 
Ahab to his demise. Whereas Ishmael is able to cleanse himself of his oath and break free 
from his isolation (if only temporarily) by squeezing the hands of his shipmates while 
desiring to converge all people into a single loving being, Ahab fails to ‘squeeze’ himself 
into Starbuck during his own aborted communion. He remains an Isolato as a result of his 
unshakable commitment to his individualistic goals and ultimately sacrifices the lives of 
his crew on the altar of his ‘sovereignty of self’ and his pursuit of personal fulfillment.  
Ishmael’s Compromise 
 Critics commonly ask why Ishmael of all the potential candidates aboard the 
Pequod is the one to survive and narrate the story; in this line of inquiry, any traits that 
distinguish Ishmael from the other members of the crew may hold the answer. Among a 
cast of characters comprised of ‘nearly all isolatoes,’ Ishmael’s most distinguishing 
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feature is his genuine love for humanity and his embrace of human connection, especially 
with Queequeg, but also with the other spermaceti-squeezing crewmembers with whom 
he experiences his transcendent moment. There is, however, another important aspect of 
Ishmael’s humanism that deserves examination: the ability to compromise. Unitarianism 
in the mid-nineteenth century, as well as some branches of twentieth-century secular 
humanism, frequently received criticism for encapsulating their humanist message of 
acceptance and open-mindedness in a dogmatic and uncompromising form, encouraging 
both homogenized ritual and doctrine as a conduit for unity.52 Contrastingly, Ishmael 
repeatedly advocates an idealized “indifference of agnostic detachment” both in one’s 
metaphysical worldview and in one’s value system, as Thompson observes.53  
 In a show of compromise, Ishmael cautions against commitment to both belief 
and unbelief, finding that such attitudes create an imbalanced perspective: “Doubts of all 
things earthly, and intuitions of some things heavenly; this combination makes neither 
believer nor infidel, but makes a man who regards them both with an equal eye” (MD, 
409). Ishmael is capable of living with ambiguity and human limitations; this capability 
inoculates him against the urge toward absolute truth or toward complete reduction of his 
ontology to self-existent features of reality.  
 Ishmael demonstrates this capability in his meditation on Moby Dick, wherein he 
determines that it is the “whiteness of the whale” that alarms him most (MD 204). 
Ishmael views the color white as representative of the ambiguous nature of reality, 
perceiving white to be both the absence of color and the “concrete of every color,” likely 
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evidenced to him by the separation of white light through a prism (MD, 212). Ishmael 
also finds ambiguity in numerous associations with the color white, contrasting its 
positive associations with “divine spotlessness and power” including the “very veil of the 
Christian deity” alongside negative associations with “terrors” like polar bears and great 
white sharks and “strangely hideous” appearance of “albino” persons (MD, 205-212). 
Instead of curiosity, Ishmael concludes with caution: “Wonder ye then at the fiery hunt?” 
(MD, 212). By asking this question, Ishmael implies that there are limits to human 
understanding or human capability and that this boundary ought to be observed. Through 
this meditation, Ishmael recognizes and respects that there are potentially irreconcilable 
ambiguities in the white whale and thus in reality. 
 Contrastingly, Ahab hates all things inscrutable and refuses to concede that such 
things must remain unknown: “All visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard masks… If 
man will strike, strike through the mask! How else can the prisoner reach outside except 
by thrusting through the wall? To me, the white whale is that wall” (MD, 178). Ishmael’s 
positive agnosticism involves not knowing whether or not human value is an objective or 
intrinsic feature of the world, but his acceptance of ambiguity keeps him stable, whereas 
Ahab’s unattainable desire to ‘strike through the mask’ and fully comprehend the nature 
of reality intensifies his obsession with Moby Dick to the point of madness. Despite still 
participating in the ‘fiery hunt,’ Ishmael remains unbound by his “horrible oath” to Ahab, 
having “washed [his] hands and [his] heart” of it in his spermaceti baptism (MD, 455-
456).” Instead, Ishmael realigns his priorities around humanity, which is knowable, as 
opposed to divinity, which is not. 
  29 
 Even Queequeg, despite the humanist spirit with which he is endowed, refuses to 
compromise on metaphysical positions. When discussing religion with Queequeg, 
Ishmael finds him to be “dull of hearing on that important subject, unless considered 
from his own point of view” (MD, 95). Furthermore, Queequeg seems to pity Ishmael for 
being “lost to evangelical pagan piety,” as Ishmael notes, “[Queequeg] no doubt thought 
he knew a good deal more about the true religion than I did. He looked at me with a sort 
of condescending concern and compassion” (MD, 95). This term ‘true religion’ is a 
reference not only to the rhetoric of Christian missionaries who evangelized to 
communities comprised of pagans (believers of ‘false religion’) like Queequeg, but also, 
as John Lardas Modern explains, to antebellum religious philosophy in which ‘true 
religion’ denoted democratized aspects of faith accessible to all through the use of 
‘common sense’ in practical life.54  
 Queequeg then mirrors numerous facets of Protestant Christianity, subversively 
redressed in pagan guise. Just as Protestant Christianity fragmented based on doctrinal 
disputes—that is, claims of certainty regarding interpretations of a vague and multiply 
interpretable text—Queequeg remains uncompromising in his religious and metaphysical 
position despite being unable to read for himself the doctrine of his faith, which is 
tattooed on his skin and which he carves into the coffin that assists Ishmael’s survival. 
Queequeg, like the uncompromising Protestants who perish aboard the Pequod, accepts 
his own culturally dominant religion as ‘true religion’ and pities those with differing 
religious commitments, whereas Ishmael proves willing to participate in Queequeg’s 
worship and to navigate religious difference with an open heart. Queequeg does attend 
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Father Mapple’s sermon, but his perception of the chapel mirrors the patronizing attitude 
of Christian missionaries toward ‘uncivilized’ pagans; that is, Queequeg observes 
everything with a “wondering gaze of incredulous curiosity,” which signals at best an 
anthropological interest (MD, 41).  
 Queequeg, Ahab, and all others aboard the Pequod are therefore drowned under 
the weight of their disappointed metaphysical expectations upon encountering the white 
whale, a symbol of metaphysical ambiguity and the limits of human understanding, 
whereas Ishmael’s detachment removes him from Ahab’s boat in the final chase (he is 
“dropped astern”) and equips him to survive by floating on Queequeg’s coffin (MD, 625). 
This morbid “life-buoy” is not only a reward for Ishmael’s communion and “brotherly 
love” with Queequeg, but also the platform of a religious viewpoint different from 
Ishmael’s own—the tattoo markings that Queequeg etched into the coffin (MD, 625). 
Thus Ishmael is saved, in part due to his message of humanism that enabled Queequeg—
the maker of the life-saving coffin—to board the ship despite his religious difference, and 
in part due to his ability to accept ambiguity, to consider other points of view, and to 
maintain an objective balance between belief and doubt.  
Ishmael, Secular Humanist 
 The worldview held and articulated by Ishmael anticipates the course of twentieth 
century secular humanism. Although his personal belief system is complicated and 
certainly stems from a foundation of religion, Ishmael’s secular humanism persists in 
each stage of his ideological development: he prioritizes human connection above 
religious doctrine in his moment of ‘conversion’ and subsequent idolatry with Queequeg; 
he accepts religious and cultural difference, emphasizes human value, and expresses 
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belonging to a unified humanity in his ‘declaration of faith’ to Bildad and Peleg; he 
participates in universal sodality and experiences transcendent ‘communion’ with his 
shipmates in a spermaceti baptism. Moreover, Ishmael accepts the ambiguity of 
metaphysical reality, commits to a moral system ontologically independent of divinity, 
and rejects individualism as a guiding principle. Ishmael therefore, regardless of his 
religious affiliation, is quintessentially secular humanist. 
 Ishmael may be Melville’s representation of an ideal humanist. That is not to say, 
however, that Melville shares Ishmael’s ideals completely, or that he embeds his own 
worldview within Ishmael’s. Indeed, readers are often too eager to conflate characters 
with their authors. Melville approaches secular humanism with the same skepticism with 
which he engages Unitarianism and other moral and metaphysical positions. While 
Melville consistently advocates for some key features of secular humanism in his major 
works, he puts the ideology to the test in his novels after Moby Dick and expresses 
serious doubts. If anything, Melville finds secular humanism to be compelling 
theoretically, but, echoing a common criticism of humanism, he shows it to be 
problematic in practice. Such doubts are hinted at in Moby Dick—for example, Ishmael’s 
humanist position fails to save his fellow crewmates aboard the Pequod—but Melville 
confronts his doubts more directly in his story of another young idealist, the eponymous 
protagonist of Pierre. 
 




Chapter II: Pierre and the Dark Side of Idealism 
 Less than a year after the publication of Moby Dick, which was fraught with 
editorial issues and resulted in poor reviews and underwhelming sales, Melville wrote 
what was intended to be a novel “calculated for popularity” to appease his publishers and 
win back readers.55 To their dismay, however, Pierre: or, The Ambiguities (1852)—a 
domestic tale in the vein of popular romanticism referred to by Melville as a “rural bowl 
of milk” in a letter to Sophia Hawthorne—is instead a puzzling psychological tragedy 
interrupted by philosophical digressions.56  
 In the novel, Pierre Glendenning, the teenage son of a wealthy widow, breaks off 
his idyllic engagement to Lucy Tartan after meeting the mysterious orphan Isabel, who 
claims to be the illegitimate daughter of his late father. For a variety of motives, 
including his self-sacrificial drive to Christian charity, his suppressed sexual desire for 
Isabel, and his choice to preserve his cherished father’s memory, Pierre pretends to elope 
with Isabel. After his mother disowns him, Pierre leaves behind his pastoral home in 
Saddle Meadows and moves to the city along with Isabel and a woman named Delly, the 
disgraced mother of a deceased illegitimate child. They first seek hospitality from 
Pierre’s cousin (and boyhood lover) Glen Stanley, but Glen betrays Pierre by refusing to 
recognize him. So they move into the Church of the Apostles—a repurposed church 
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serving as apartments for penniless idealist reformers, philosophers, and artists. Pierre 
attempts to provide for Isabel and Delly by working as an author, but has little success. 
After being informed of his mother’s death, torn between Isabel and Lucy (who follows 
him to the city), sued by his publisher, threatened and insulted by Lucy’s brothers and his 
cousin Glen, and disillusioned with his own decisions, Pierre murders Glen in a public 
square. Lucy and Isabel visit him in prison, and with melodramatic flourish, Lucy dies 
from shock upon hearing Isabelle call Pierre her brother, and Pierre and Isabel commit 
suicide by drinking poison. 
 At first glance, Pierre seems a major departure for Melville as it contrasts with his 
prior work not only in genre and setting, but also in style, structure, and point-of-view. 
Many twentieth-century critics, echoing the novel’s early sensationalist reviews, find this 
departure to be severe enough to support claims of deterioration in Melville’s mental 
health.57 Stylistic differences and psychological diagnoses aside, however, Pierre directly 
continues the thematic explorations central to Moby Dick, as William B. Dillingham 
succinctly explains: “the mode of expression is different, but what is being expressed is 
the same.”58 So what was it that Melville felt had been left so unresolved in Moby Dick 
that compelled him to write yet another long, philosophical novel?59  
                                                
 57 Countless critics support some version of this madness narrative, including some influential 
twentieth-century Melvillians: Newton Arvin, Herman Melville (New York: Sloane, 1950); F.O. 
Matthiessen, American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1968).  
 
 58 William B. Dillingham, Melville’s Later Novels (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 
148. 
 
 59 I am indebted to Philip F. Gura for posing this question in one of our invaluable discussions.  
  34 
 Pursuing this inquiry, some critics approach Pierre as a sequel to Moby Dick 
rather than as a self-contained or independently valuable creation.60 But Pierre is not a 
recreation of so much as a reaction to Moby Dick—an alternate approach to the inquiries 
and assumptions of the whaling novel, which marks a shift in Melville’s philosophical 
concerns from metaphysics to problems in value theory, as some critics have previously 
noted.61 Furthermore, each novel contains a tragic hero, but instead of reformulating 
Ahab’s demise in a pastoral setting, the tragedy here befalls Pierre—a youthful idealist 
not unlike Ishmael. While Pierre certainly shares important traits with the egomaniacal 
and monomaniacal captain of the Pequod, his downfall is in many ways the “opposite of 
Ahab’s,” F.O. Matthiessen explains, because it comes from “[following] unswervingly 
his generous impulses” instead of Ahab-like egomania, so his destruction results from 
being “full of sympathy [and] careless of himself.”62 Pierre shares many of Ishmael’s 
humanist ideals, but instead of serving as the protagonist’s saving grace, this very 
idealism contributes to his demise. 
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Pierre’s Awakening 
 Pierre is divided into two distinct sections, beginning with the pastoral scenery of 
Saddle Meadows and its population of Protestant Christians and transitioning to an 
industrial city where Pierre houses himself among a group of secular reformers. Many of 
Pierre’s critics consider the protagonist’s journey from the rural warmth of country into 
the cold urbanity of the city to be exemplary of a nineteenth-century trope symbolizing 
the industrialization of the United States, which, as Samuel Otter observes, is often 
depicted as a transformation “from rural golden age to urban wasteland.”63 Others have 
noticed, however, that the rural-urban dichotomy in Pierre is markedly more 
complicated. Otter argues, “Saddle Meadows is not the site of innocence but the 
intersections of intense political, patriarchal, and sexual anxieties,” noting that the 
“explicit rhetoric of rural paradise” is repeatedly challenged by “displacements, 
overstatements, anticlimaxes, and the mingling of categories.”64 Spengemann concurs, 
finding Pierre’s life at Saddle Meadows to be both delightful and horribly false, and 
calling it “a lovely delusion made ghastly” by its falsity.65 Nicola Nixon too finds the 
rural in Pierre to be “no Walden-like retreat from urban strife;” rather, it is the site of the 
“the grossest disparities in class and privilege.”66 
 Similarly, while the city is portrayed as dark, cold, and full of madness, it is also 
the locale of democratic egalitarianism. Nixon, examining the political aspects of the 
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rural-urban dichotomy, interprets Pierre’s ‘Crossing of the Rubicon’ as moving “from 
pastoral feudalism to urban democracy, abandoning his paternal birthright… to become 
the embodiment of the much-celebrated Emersonian self-reliant man.”67 Nixon notes, 
however, that this personal revolution—“exchanging one American social order for 
another,” as she says—does not settle which order is morally superior because the 
protagonist fails to actually investigate either one.68 Given the complexities of this 
dichotomy, the two sections of the novel can be distinguished from one another in 
numerous ways: culturally, politically, economically, ideologically, and even stylistically. 
Regardless of the difficulties Pierre faces in the city, his move from Saddle Meadows 
illustrates his inner transition from naïve contentment to pained awareness—an epiphany 
he never wishes undone. 
 Much like Ishmael’s transformative moment during his befriending of Queequeg, 
Pierre too has a life-changing, perspective-altering experience upon learning from 
Isabel’s letter that she may be his half-sister, thus alleging that his father—his idealized 
god-figure—is an adulterer. Pierre’s ‘awakening’ is not a burst of positive emotion akin 
to the internal ‘melting’ described by Ishmael; rather, it is a violent, painful jolt from 
blissful ignorance into miserable wisdom. This new perspective, like a clarifying bolt of 
lightning, transfigures the “long-cherished image of his father… from a green foliaged 
tree into a blasted trunk” and exposes his mother’s seemingly unconditional love as 
merely the “glittering folds of pride.”69 Pierre sees all preceding ambiguities “ripped open 
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as if with a keen sword,” and realizes the great psychological cost of this epiphany as he 
envisions the arrival of “thickening phantoms of an infinite gloom” (P, 85). 
 Pierre’s loss of innocence, like Adam and Eve’s in the book of Genesis, coincides 
with his acquisition of ‘knowledge of good and evil.’70 Through this new knowledge, 
Adam and Eve become aware of their own nakedness; Pierre becomes aware of his own 
deficit—not of clothing, but of discernment of truth and falsity. The former clothe their 
nakedness; Pierre “tear[s] all veils” from his former idols and resolves to “see the hidden 
things” (P, 66). And as Adam and Eve are cast out of the Garden of Eden, beginning the 
fallen state of humankind, so Pierre is exiled from Saddle Meadows, never to return to 
the Edenic state of his former life; from Pierre’s perspective, however, it is Saddle 
Meadows—not himself—that has become spiritually fallen.  
 Being stripped of his illusions divorces Pierre not only from his idyllic youth, but 
also from all features of his reality, symbolized by his blurring, cross-eyed vision: “On all 
sides, the physical world of solid objects now slidingly displaced itself from around him, 
and he floated into an ether of visions” (P, 85). The narrator finds this displacement to be 
a needed correction: “Ere his great grief came upon him, all the objects which surrounded 
him were concealingly deceptive” (P, 88-90). Pierre’s break with his idealized life is 
severe to such an extent that he begins to disassociate objects from their given meanings, 
creating a distrust of reality and turning his world into one of perpetual epistemic 
confusion. Despite this condition, Pierre refuses to apply his newfound skepticism to his 
foundational principles, so his distrust of everything from his familial and social identity 
to ordinary objects does not induce him to question the nature of his moral values nor to 
                                                
 70 Gen. 3:22-24 (King James Bible) 
  38 
doubt the existence of absolute truth, as demonstrated by his resolution: “Henceforth, I 
will know nothing but truth, glad Truth, or sad Truth. I will know what is” (P, 65; 
emphasis in the original). 
 Pierre’s condition is largely demonstrative of Melville’s own religious and artistic 
crises in his post-Moby Dick disappointment. Charles N. Watson, Jr. believes that Pierre’s 
revelation reflects Melville’s own emerging pessimism and dismay as a professional 
writer, beginning with the author’s perception that his family, his publisher, and his 
readers had betrayed him.71 Watson identifies several dimensions to this overall 
‘darkening’ of Melville’s life and work, including “religious disillusionment… an 
increasing skepticism about the benevolence and even the existence of God,” artistic 
crisis due to doubts about “the ability of art to perform the lofty truth-telling function he 
had conceived for it,” and finally, “epistemological nihilism—that truth either cannot be 
known or does not even exist.”72 Similar doubts assail young Pierre upon reading Isabel’s 
letter. This doubt does not shake Pierre’s resolve; on the contrary, it redoubles it. Instead 
of losing faith in his ideal vision, he becomes repulsed by a world that refuses to live up 
to that vision.  
Pierre’s Idealism and ‘The Absolute’ 
 Pierre is best characterized as an idealist and moral absolutist. An ideology is a 
system or set of ideals and beliefs, each of which contributes to satisfying one’s 
conception of what is perfect, right, or true. Idealism, then, is full commitment to 
pursuing or embodying an ideology, especially to an unrealistic degree. As in the 
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previous chapter, the ‘absolute’ refers to some unchangeable and self-existent feature of 
reality, although in Pierre the ‘absolute’ in question concerns the existence or non-
existence of objective moral truths.  
 Pierre’s ideology draws from numerous cultural, political, and moral tributaries 
inherent in his upbringing. Facets of his ideology encompass Spenserian views of “all-
bewildering beauty” and romantic love, patriotic and familial pride in his “martial race” 
of “American” forefathers, and grandiose conceptions of what his father called the 
“meek, but kingly style” of Christian gentlemanliness (P, 6). Despite “inherit[ing]” his 
faith through an “insensible sliding process” rather than adopting it with an “absolute 
motive,” Pierre also comes to possess grandiose conceptions of Christlike martyrdom, 
which he draws upon when formulating his plan to elope with Isabel (P, 7). Though not 
devout in a traditional sense, Pierre nevertheless insists on holding himself and the world 
accountable to Jesus Christ’s teachings on charity and goodwill from the ‘Sermon on the 
Mount,’ described as an “inexhaustible soul-melting stream of loving-kindness” which 
embodies “all the love of the past, and… any conceivable future” (P, 207). When Pierre 
sees that his world fails to live up to such ideals, he decides to emulate Jesus Christ’s 
example of self-sacrifice with his own grand martyrdom fantasy.  
 Pierre’s religious beliefs originate in the culture of upper-class Protestant 
Christianity in his rural Saddle Meadows community, and he justifies (or rationalizes) 
many of his actions according to his religious feelings. Melville’s biographers find 
Pierre’s background to be an obvious retelling of the author’s own upbringing, including 
his family’s religious arrangement. Melville’s father Allan casually practiced a form of 
mild Unitarianism, which according to his mother Maria, a devout follower of Calvinis
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via the Dutch Reformed Church, tended to “diminish the majesty of God in favor of the 
dignity of man”—a criticism later levied against secular humanism.73 It is Maria’s 
Calvinism conflated with upper-class Episcopalianism that dominates the religious 
culture of Saddle Meadows, and it is the casual Unitarianism of his father that manifests 
as the Church of the Apostles.  
 Despite the dissimilarities between these two sects, each sect presents Pierre with 
the same fatal hypocrisy; that is, they both operate in the name of Christianity and yet fail 
to live up to Jesus Christ’s message of charity and mercy. Pierre’s perception of 
hypocrisy in these institutions may be accurate, but his downfall demonstrates that there 
are countless ways in which the opposite approach, the pursuit of perfect virtue, can also 
lead one astray. Pierre discovers that absolutism, even for such seemingly innocuous 
principles as charity and mercy, may lead to destruction.  
 One potentially harmful consequence of pursuing such perfection, for example, is 
despair—the dark side of idealism. Once idealists begin to will all of humanity to 
embrace and live according their own ideals, they will invariably be disappointed. Such 
disappointment is a breeding ground for despair, depression, and even hatred or 
resentment of humanity—an undermining attitude for anyone whose ideals are based on 
universal love. Moreover, absolutists who fail to live up to their own ideals face even 
greater psychological repercussions, such as guilt, self-loathing, or even self-harm.    
 Recognizing this, the differences between the idealism of Ishmael and Pierre 
become apparent. Whereas Ishmael’s idealism dictates his own interaction with the 
world, motivating him to act according to his humanist principles, Pierre holds everyone 
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else accountable to his ideals, leaving him continually revolted by human societies that 
fail to live up to such expectations; this universal judgment is evident in Pierre’s 
exclamation to Reverend Falsgrave, “Everything is the matter; the whole world is the 
matter” (P, 162). While Ishmael’s ‘awakening’ causes him to choose Christlike love for 
humanity at the expense of prior moral commitments (particularly the biblical 
commandment prohibiting idolatry), Pierre’s ‘awakening’ accomplishes nearly the 
opposite, as he cements himself in moral absolutism regardless of the consequences to his 
mother, his fiancé, and others.  
 Of course, it could be argued that Pierre too chooses love for humanity over 
certain doctrinal commitments (such as ‘honor thy mother’) by taking Isabel and Delly 
under his care against his mother’s wishes, thus emulating a Christlike example of charity 
for his orphaned sister and of mercy for the ‘fallen’ woman. Any positive readings of 
Pierre’s moral absolutism, however, must account for his problematic motives, 
particularly his lust for Isabel, as well as his rejection and separation from his 
community, his abhorrence of humanity, and the heartbreak that he causes by abandoning 
Lucy. Pierre’s apologists must also account for the utter destruction of his life and the 
lives of those around him, which results from his attempt to live up to an impossible 
standard of Christlikeness. 
 Further distinguishing the two young idealists, Pierre lacks Ishmael’s capability of 
dealing with ambiguity. He rejects all notions of subjectivity and relativism and refutes 
the ambiguities that pervade not only his circumstances, but also his own motives and 
beliefs; for example, his commitment to ‘know nothing but the truth’ is undercut by his 
‘unconscious’ admission that “sometimes a lie is heavenly, and truth infernal,” although 
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he attempts to distance himself from this thought (P, 92). This “incapacity for 
ambiguity,” as Priscilla Wald calls it, manifests in Pierre’s approach to nearly everything 
he thinks and does.74 For example, Wald argues that this ‘incapacity’ explains Pierre’s 
choice to “legitimize Isabel with a fictitious marriage” and thereby to continue operating 
within the cultural modes of familial legacy already in place in Saddle Meadows despite 
losing faith in precisely those institutions and in the concept of legitimacy itself.75 
 Interestingly, Pierre possesses both qualities that Ishmael prescribes for a well-
balanced perspective: “doubts of all things earthly and intuitions of some things 
heavenly” (MD, 409). Pierre’s ‘doubts of all things earthly’ manifest in his 
aforementioned skepticism regarding ordinary objects (much like Ahab’s perception of 
all things as ‘paperboard masks’), whereas his “sublime intuitiveness,” despite being 
“ever obscured by the dense fogs of earth,” still impresses upon him the “sun-like glories 
of god-like truth and virtue” (P, 111). Rather than making him a man who “regards them 
both with an equal eye” (MD, 409), however, these qualities cause Pierre to completely 
abandon ‘all things earthly’ in favor of reaching exclusively for the divine. Ishmael also 
cautions, “There is a wisdom that is woe; but there is a woe that is madness,” 
paraphrasing King Solomon’s advice not to wander “out of the way of understanding” 
(MD, 465). The narrator in Pierre offers a similar warning about truth: “it is not for man 
to follow the trail of truth too far, since by so doing he entirely loses the directing 
compass of his mind” (P, 165). But Pierre disregards such notions, committing himself to 
follow ‘sad truth,’ even to his own destruction. 
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 Pierre is not oblivious to the potential liability of this Promethean quality in 
himself, which more nearly resembles a trait of Ahab than of Ishmael. For example, when 
swearing by heaven to testify to Lucy’s brightness and beauty, Pierre admits that his love 
is “profane, since it mortally reaches toward the heaven in ye” (P, 4). This ‘profane’ 
quality of reaching for heaven in all things is Pierre’s tragic flaw; it dictates the course of 
his downfall, as, disillusioned with the “delicate warmths” of his former worldview, he 
instead “madly demand[s] more ardent fires” (P, 6; emphasis added). Just as Ahab insists 
upon “treating with all Powers upon an equal basis,” as Melville writes, Pierre too 
decides that he “shall declare [himself] an equal power” with both God and humankind in 
the event that both refuse to vindicate his actions (P, 107).76 In his declaration that he will 
‘know what is’ and will act solely according to “what [his] deepest angel dictates,” Pierre 
commits to pursue truth and virtue above all, even if they supersede the will of ‘Heaven’ 
(P, 65). This moral absolutism, like Ahab’s metaphysical absolutism, is a form of 
madness. Pierre’s ‘white whale’ is his idea of virtue; like Ahab, he pursues it even to the 
point of blasphemy.  
Pierre vs. Moral Relativism 
 Relativism is the position that morality and truth are not absolute; being neither 
objective nor universally applicable, they exist only in relation to certain contexts, usually 
defined culturally, historically, or even individually. Melville struggles with relativist 
implications in all aspects of his philosophy, not only in moral questions. For example, 
regarding epistemology, the study of the nature of knowledge and theories of justification 
for belief, Ishmael advocates for skeptical indifference. Ishmael compares John Locke 
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and Immanuel Kant, representatives of two major opposing schools of epistemological 
thought—empiricism and “Platonic idealism,” respectively—and dismisses both.77 
Instead of “trimming boat” or flip-flopping between empiricism and idealism, Ishmael 
urges, “throw all these thunder-heads overboard, and then you will float light and right” 
(MD, 357). 
 After Ishmael rejects these epistemological theories, his shipmates demonstrate 
the subjective nature of human experience by forming varying interpretations of the 
symbols on an Ecuadorian doubloon: Ahab sees his own “mysterious self,” Starbuck 
perceives the Christian trinity, Stubb identifies optimism in the “jolly sun,” and Flask 
calculates the coin’s monetary value in cigars (MD, 470-475). Then Pip, seemingly 
practicing his grammar, repeats, “I look, you look, he looks; we look, ye look, they look” 
(MD, 475). Pip’s recitation, though seemingly nonsense, actually identifies the purpose of 
the passage by drawing attention to the subjective act of ‘looking.’ Regardless of whether 
or not the symbols have intrinsic meaning, the observers can only perceive the symbols—
and reality—through their own individual prejudices and motivations.  
 In Pierre, Melville confronts his protagonist with messages of moral relativism at 
every turn. Both religious and secular authorities alike—personified by Reverend 
Falsgrave and the philosopher Plotinus Plinlimmon, respectively—attempt to persuade 
Pierre of what Ishmael calls a “sage and sensible conclusion that a man’s religion is one 
thing, and this practical world quite another” (MD, 83). For Pierre, however, the possible 
truth of this ‘sage and sensible conclusion’ is devastating, and his self-destruction 
                                                
 77 Immanuel Kant was an idealist insofar as he believed that some a priori knowledge could have 
transcendental origins, but his views differed from traditional Platonic idealism. Melville may have been 
unfamiliar with Kant’s exact position, but likely associated Kant with Platonic Idealism based on cultural 
perception of the major branches of philosophy. See Nancy Fredricks, Melville’s Art of Democracy 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 17. 
  45 
coincides with his acquisition of what Herschel Parker calls “tragic knowledge… that 
Christianity as Jesus taught it [is], however alluring, also impracticable.”78 Moreover, 
Falsgrave and Plinlimmon together account for both sides of the rural-urban dichotomy, 
leaving no place for Pierre’s moral absolutism.  
 Pierre first encounters moral relativism at breakfast with his mother, Mrs. 
Glendenning, and Saddle Meadows’ religious authority Reverend Falsgrave. In a 
discussion regarding Delly being disowned by her family because of her adultery, Pierre 
and Mrs. Glendenning oppose one another, with the former advocating for mercy and the 
latter demanding condemnation. Taking the opportunity to seek moral advice without 
disclosing knowledge of his late father’s affair or of Isabel, Pierre asks Falsgrave whether 
or not a son ought to continue honoring his father even if the man was a “seducer,” and 
whether or not one should look upon an illegitimate half-sibling with familial love (P, 
101-102). Falsgrave, who finds it a “social disadvantage” that clergy are expected to have 
greater moral insights than their congregation, presents to Pierre the problem of 
ambiguity that undermines moral absolutism: “Millions of circumstances modify all 
moral questions, so that though conscience may possibly dictate freely in any known 
special case; yet, by one universal maxim, to embrace all moral contingencies,—this is 
not only impossible, but the attempt, to me, seems foolish” (P, 102). Here Falsgrave 
advocates for a moral system based on exercising one’s conscience on a case-by-case 
basis—situational relativism or situation ethics, formally—which entails a denial of the 
existence of universal principles that are applicable in every circumstance. Unlike 
cultural or historical relativism, which hold that morality is merely a human construct that 
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varies according to place or time, situational relativism does permit the possibility of 
objectively right actions, but holds this rightness to be relative to the situation.  
 Neither of Falsgrave’s interlocutors finds his neutrality to be satisfactory. Pierre 
petitions for mercy on behalf of Delly, referencing Jesus Christ’s defense of the 
adulteress in the Gospel of John (P, 101).79 Mrs. Glendenning, a fundamentalist Calvinist, 
forces the Reverend to recall a different Bible passage regarding a parent’s sin being 
“visited upon the children to the third generation” (P, 100). By this doctrine she 
condemns both Delly and her infant child, finding them equally deserving of eviction; 
moreover, she calls it a “blemish” in Falsgrave’s character that “the benevolence of his 
heart, too much warps in him the holy rigor of our Church’s doctrines (P, 101). 
Nevertheless, Falsgrave maintains that such questions in morals are “absolutely incapable 
of a definite answer, which shall be universally applicable” (P, 103). 
 In a remarkably Hawthornian episode, each of Falsgrave’s endorsements for 
relativism are punctuated by his “surplice-like napkin” dropping from his collar, 
revealing a brooch carved with the symbol of the union of serpent and dove (P, 102-
103)—a common symbol, here alluding to Jesus Christ’s charge to his apostles to be 
“wise as serpents, and harmless as doves.”80 Falsgrave, a “shrewd, benevolent-minded 
man” and thus the embodiment of this balance between serpent and dove, refrains from 
sharing his own opinion in order to avoid inciting dissent with esteemed community 
members (P, 102). Because of this, Brian Higgins notes, Falsgrave directly opposes the 
sermon of Father Mapple, which indicts anyone charmed away from ‘Gospel Duty’ and 
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warns against trying to ‘please rather than to appall.’81 The dropping of the Reverend’s 
‘surplice-like’ napkin, then, further symbolizes a failure of his duty as a ‘man of the 
cloth’ to speak the Gospel truth indiscriminately.  
 Pierre initially expresses agreement with Falsgrave’s relativist assertions, but later 
recants after learning that the Reverend has failed to oppose Delly’s eviction from the 
neighborhood. Pierre rebukes Falsgrave, announcing, “A hint from heaven assures me 
now, that thou hast no earnest and world-disdaining counsel for me. I must seek it direct 
from God himself” (P, 164). Pierre not only rejects Falsgrave’s moral authority, but also 
learns to distrust institutionalized Christianity altogether, accusing it of being 
“unavoidably entangled by all fleshly alliances” and incapable of “[moving] with godly 
freedom in a world of benefices” (P, 164). Despite his own actions being ‘unavoidably 
entangled’ by his fleshly desire for Isabel, Pierre’s rejection of the church’s authority 
only further justifies to him the rightness of his absolutism.  
 Pierre’s ideology thereafter encompasses a spurning of religious dogma and 
hypocrisy, an endorsement of the moral responsibility of individuals, and a valuing of 
human well being; by this combination, Pierre’s moral drive, while still directly inspired 
by the example and teachings of Jesus Christ, manifests in secular humanist form. Laura 
López Peña identifies this same manifestation in the author: “By rejecting any form of 
institutionalized religion and dogma, Melville seems to suggest that the fraternal love and 
forbearance promoted—yet sometimes not practiced—by religious institutions need to 
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emerge from individuals.”82 However, Peña argues, Melville also “moves closer to a 
secular rather than religious view of morality that is based on the fact of being… and 
being-with others.”83 Based on Peña’s interpretation, it seems Melville’s moral position 
involves two key components: first, individuals, not institutions, must be responsible for 
the moral justification and promotion of the principle of ‘fraternal love;’ secondly, 
although this principle must emerge from individuals, it must be practiced 
interdependently with others in a manner similar to that of Ishmael and Queequeg. While 
Pierre succeeds in manifesting his own moral drive to humanism, he fails to incorporate 
others into his humanist vision, foolishly attempting to forge human community using 
only the tools of ‘rugged individualism.’  
 Pierre encounters moral relativism again in a pamphlet he discovers while 
journeying to the city, this time in the writings of a more secular authority. This 
pamphlet, written by the philosopher and leader of the ‘Apostles’ Plotinus Plinlimmon, 
serves as both a philosophical centerpiece and as the dividing line between the rural and 
urban sections of the novel. To formulate his argument for relativism, Plinlimmon uses a 
nautical timekeeping metaphor in which “Chronometricals” refer to the perfect and 
divine morality accomplishable only in heaven, whereas “Horologicals” refer to the 
“attainable earthly excellence” that is necessarily adjusted to accommodate practical 
human experience (P, 210-215). According to Plinlimmon, Pierre’s most cherished 
doctrine, the Sermon on the Mount, has been “proved entirely impracticable” in human 
history (P, 215). From this, Plinlimmon draws the following conclusion: 
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 In things terrestrial (Horological) a man must not be governed by ideas celestial 
 (chronometrical); that certain minor self-renunciations… his own mere 
 instinct… will teach him to make, but he must by no means make a complete 
 unconditional sacrifice of himself in behalf of any other being, or any cause, or 
 any conceit. […] A virtuous expediency, then, seems the highest desirable or 
 attainable earthly excellence for the mass of men, and is the only earthly 
 excellence that their Creator intended for them (P, 214).  
 
 Plinlimmon’s relativism expands upon the situational relativism of Falsgrave by 
adding a guiding principle: ‘virtuous expediency.’ This type of situational relativism, 
called pragmatism, is concerned with finding the best possible solution for any given 
moral dilemma based on which course of action is most practical, is most beneficial, and 
can reasonably be accomplished; thus, pragmatism is concerned with consequences rather 
than actions. Moreover, the pamphlet’s goal of promoting the “highest desirable or 
attainable excellence for the mass of men” recalls Utilitarian theories, which traditionally 
hold that in most cases the moral action is whichever promotes the best outcome for the 
most people (P, 214; emphasis added). A Plinlimmonian utopia, therefore, is one in 
which all people act according to a reasonable balance between their own well being and 
generosity; if everyone collectively provides a little charity, no individuals will be 
compelled to be too charitable for their own good. The thesis of ‘virtuous expediency,’ 
then, is that one ought to be charitable only in cases when no undue self-sacrifice is 
required, and that any ‘minor self-renunciations’ ought to be performed with a proper 
instinct toward one’s own general well being.  
 There is, however, a less charitable reading of ‘virtuous expediency’ available, 
since the pamphlet implies that one ought to be charitable so long as it is convenient. 
Such a reading casts Plinlimmon as an enabler who seeks to moralize self-interest by 
discouraging charitable acts except for in trivial cases when it costs little or nothing. 
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Plinlimmon claims that people can put off trying to be Christlike until they go to heaven, 
for in heaven, “they can freely turn the left cheek, because there the right cheek will 
never be smitten,” and “they can freely give all to the poor [because] there will be no 
poor to give to” (P, 214). The same ‘virtuous expediency’ will be sufficient in heaven 
because there will be no cause for anything greater. By this interpretation, the difference 
between heavenly ‘chronometrical’ morality and earthly ‘horological’ morality is found 
not in the agent but in the environment, thus absolving individuals and society of the 
moral responsibility to care for the less fortunate. In any case, Plinlimmon’s theory 
condemns Pierre’s ‘unconditional self-sacrifice’ because it goes against his own best 
interest and is therefore virtuously inexpedient. Plinlimmon and Falsgrave agree that any 
attempt to live according to a moral ‘chronometrical’ or absolute is foolish.  
 Unsurprisingly, Pierre’s critics disagree about many aspects of the pamphlet, 
particularly its role in the novel and the relationship between Melville’s own philosophy 
and that of Plinlimmon. Some treat the pamphlet’s message as a straightforward 
presentation of Melville’s own philosophy.84 Others believe precisely the opposite, 
interpreting the pamphlet as a satire intended to indict relativist philosophers and 
institutions.85 Still others try to link Plinlimmon and his philosophy to specific individuals 
such as Nathaniel Hawthorne, Benedict De Spinoza, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and others in 
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an attempt to pinpoint the target of Melville’s criticism.86 Higgins, for example, finds 
Plinlimmon’s refutation of unconditional self-sacrifice to be undoubtedly Baconian, 
pointing out that Francis Bacon is even referenced by name in the pamphlet.87 
 Based on the ‘less charitable’ reading of Plinlimmon’s pamphlet and on the 
Hawthornian name of the relativist Reverend Falsgrave, which freely associates the 
character with both falsity and mortality, Melville clearly treats the philosopher and 
clergyman and their shared message of moral relativism with satire and suspicion if not 
with outright detestation. Plinlimmon’s deferment of moral responsibility to the afterlife 
echoes some Unitarian moralists who made similar arguments to account for their 
suspicion of upward mobility or even to defend the institution of slavery. Such Unitarians 
portrayed wealth and social status as burdens to be borne stoically, while maintaining that 
the poor and enslaved were “enviable” in their freedom from such responsibilities.88 
William Ellery Channing, for example, exclaims, “How often have I known professional 
and mercantile men toiling anxiously through the night, and sacrificing health, whilst the 
laborer has been wrapped in oblivion of all his cares!”89 
 Howe describes such arguments as a means for Unitarians to explain away 
problems with their belief, characteristic of Yankees and articulated by Henry Ware, Sr., 
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that there exists a “‘perceptible connection’ between a man’s character and condition in 
life… which was ‘part of an established scheme of Providence.’”90 Instead of promising 
worldly rewards for virtue, Howe explains, Unitarian moralists managed to maintain their 
belief in this ‘established scheme of providence’ by promising “heavenly reward for 
honest toil.”91 By aligning with Unitarian moralists who claim to be Christians and yet 
fail Christ’s charge to help the poor, Plinlimmon embodies the hypocritical religious 
humanists whom Melville attacks vehemently and passionately in many of his works. 
Melville’s criticism of moral relativism and its proponents does not, however, equate to a 
promotion of moral absolutism, which he approaches with a similar degree of suspicion 
and doubt, as evidenced by his portrayal of Pierre’s failure and demise. 
The Problem of Motives 
 The irreconcilable disparity between Pierre’s moral principles and his actions 
exemplifies the ‘problem of motives,’ which here refers to the adaptability of even the 
strictest moral principles to ‘immoral’ intentions; that is, one can act in accordance with a 
principle, but do so with ulterior ‘immoral’† motives. In some cases, the only way to 
satisfy the ‘immoral’ motive is to operate according to the principle, although the 
principle may be redefined, equivocated, rationalized, or otherwise bent to accommodate 
the agent’s intention. In other cases, one may appropriate the appearance of acting in 
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accordance with the principle for the purpose of gaining trust, evading justice, or 
otherwise facilitating the performance of the ‘immoral’ action.   
 Pierre falls into the first set of cases, in which one can only achieve one’s immoral 
desires by utilizing a moral principle. From the moment he first sees Isabel’s face, he is 
overcome with sexual desire, which only intensifies upon learning that she may be his 
sister; however, his ideological commitments prohibit him from seeking to fulfill this 
desire outright. Acting on this desire alone would put Pierre into a state of cognitive 
dissonance, which refers to the mental anxiety that results from holding conflicting 
beliefs or desires simultaneously; specifically, Pierre’s incestuous lust for Isabel is 
irreconcilable with his deeply valued Spenserian views of chivalry, his Protestant views 
of purity, his commitment to Lucy Tartan, and his sense of self, which is largely 
composed of these ideas. In order to avoid cognitive dissonance and preserve his sense of 
self and yet still satisfy his sexual desire, Pierre must operate within the framework of his 
moral principles in order to consciously or unconsciously justify his actions to himself. 
 Pierre rationalizes his decision to enter into a fake marriage with Isabel by 
appealing to his principle of Christian charity; however, he is clearly moved more by a 
mixture of sexual desire and grand delusions of self-martyrdom than by genuine charity. 
He suspects that he may merely be an “infatuate” for Isabel, yet overcomes this suspicion 
by reassuring himself that “all heaven [will] justify in him” in spite of it because his plan 
involves making him into a “grand self-renouncing victim” (P 171-173). In this way, 
Pierre mentally pre-atones for his incest and adultery with what he believes will be a 
suitable sacrifice, thereby avoiding cognitive dissonance. Furthermore, by pretending to 
marry Isabel, Pierre attempts to preserve the part of his identity and reputation that is 
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seated on aristocratic notions of familial legitimacy. He knows that his mother will 
disown him and that Lucy will feel betrayed; nevertheless, Pierre still fabricates a 
marriage with Isabel to stave off accusations of adultery, thereby satisfying his need to be 
perceived as one who operates within Biblical law. 
 There is enough evidence to suggest that Pierre consummates this potentially 
incestuous relationship, although Melville is ambiguous on this matter. Notably, many 
critics have elaborated on the seemingly incestuous relationship between Pierre and each 
of his family members, from his worship of his father, to his flirtatious relationship with 
his mother (whom he calls “sister”), to his boyhood romance with his cousin Glen.92 By 
reworking his moral principles of charity and chastity to suit his sexual and incestuous 
desires, Pierre manages to circumvent his own internal psychological obstacles that 
would prevent him acting on such motives. By such means it becomes possible for Pierre, 
an idealist reformer and moral absolutist, to commit deception, adultery, incest, murder, 
and suicide, all in the name of Christlike charity and self-sacrifice.  
 Thus, Melville challenges utilitarianism’s consequence-based theory of morality 
by identifying motives as a crucial component to moral judgment. Furthermore, through 
his psychological examination of Pierre, Melville also raises serious questions about 
moral objectivity: If humans are capable of such self-deception and of manipulation of 
moral principles, is it even possible for humans to be certain about whether or not their 
actions are morally right? How can one identify objectively right principles when one’s 
judgment is invariably warped by subjective experience?  
                                                
 92 For example, Nixon, “Compromising Politics and Herman Melville’s Pierre,” 730. 
  55 
 Melville revisits this problem of motives in The Confidence-Man: His 
Masquerade (1857), the last major novel published in his lifetime. In this experimental 
novel, a confidence man (or multiple confidence men, as some readers have suggested) 
boards the Mississippi River steamboat Fidèle, which translates to ‘faith,’ to preach a 
message of confidence or faith in humankind; however, he subverts his own message by 
using such pleas to swindle other passengers out of money.93 Tellingly, the confidence 
man is the sole voice promoting charity, goodwill, and above all, faith in humankind, as 
the other passengers antagonize this message with their own words of bitterness, distrust, 
and even hatred for their fellow human beings. Through his message of ‘confidence’ in 
humanity, he manages to convert (albeit only temporarily in some cases) some of his 
fellow passengers; in fact, he refuses to take money from his victims until they have 
expressed complete confidence or faith in him and therefore in human goodness. For the 
converted, however, one imagines that they will soon discover they have been swindled, 
and will return to their former distrust for humanity with even greater resolve.   
 The confidence man, then, exemplifies the second set of aforementioned cases, in 
which one knowingly appropriates the appearance of morality in order to trick, coerce, 
manipulate, and evade justice. In many ways, The Confidence-Man reexamines the 
central problems of Pierre on a larger scale, amplifying Pierre’s individual moral 
conundrum (that moral ideals are often impracticable and subject to corruption) into the 
struggles of a politically divided nation. Written at a time in which the United States was 
fracturing and published only four years before the nation descended into civil war, The 
Confidence-Man satirizes an era of insurmountable anxiety, distrust, and irreparable 
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division. Tellingly, the passengers aboard the Fidèle, like the nation they represent, 
express their distrust and disdain for humanity while debating the ethics of slavery, 
expansionism, capitalism, and the genocide of Native Americans, all while affirming 
egalitarian ideology and wielding Christian moral rhetoric. 
 Many critics have examined the political dimension to The Confidence-Man. Zack 
Friedman, for example, finds the confliction between the confidence man’s message and 
motive to be symbolic of capitalism, which has “a peculiar, contradictory relationship to 
trust” because it necessitates that all parties act acting according to self-interest, and yet it 
cannot operate without the level of trust necessary to conduct transactions, invest in Wall 
Street, offer credit and loans, trade stocks, sign contracts, and even use currency.94 Helen 
Trimpi notes several allusions to political events such the founding of the Republican 
Party in the mid-1850s and the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act, which threatened to permit 
the Western Territories to become slave states.95 In any case, Melville’s critique exposes 
the ‘problem of motives’ operating on a national scale, as the fracturing nation claimed 
the moral imperative of ‘manifest destiny’ in order to appropriate a continent and 
displace Native Americans, claimed the right of all persons to freedom while profiting 
from human slavery, and claimed the ideal of the ‘American Dream’ of material wealth 
and social mobility to exploit laborers and instill an imperative for consumerism.  
 But political figures are not the only target of Melville’s satire, and the confidence 
man is not the only character who subverts his moral message. Melville also attacks 
religious institutions that preach charity and faith and yet subvert this message by 
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remaining complacent toward or even approving of human atrocities. Early in the novel, 
an Episcopalian minister and a Methodist minister approach the confidence man, who is 
disguised as a disabled black beggar (a common icon of slavery in antebellum political 
cartoons), and both try to determine whether or not he is trustworthy (CM, 19-24). The 
Episcopalian minister demands to know if there is anyone on board who can vouch for 
the beggar, and then searches the boat for the persons listed—seeking evidence of his 
earnestness rather than reflexively offering charity or faith. The Methodist minister, on 
the other hand, suggests putting “as charitable construction as one can upon the poor 
fellow” and declares that people should “pray against… mistrusting his fellow man;” 
however, he too becomes suspicious and quickly turns away without offering charity, 
thus advocating for faith in humanity in words, but not in deeds (CM, 22). Melville here 
examines two denominations comprising the ends of the spectrum of the “American” 
religious caste system—the Episcopalians, long associated with elitism and wealth, and 
the Methodists, a denomination of the working class associated with concern for the 
poor—and unites them in their underlying flaws of hypocrisy, lack of charity, and lack of 
faith in their fellow human beings.96  
 Melville also identifies this problem of motives in the rhetoric and ideology of the 
influential transcendentalists Emerson and Thoreau, who appear in the novel as esoteric 
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caricatures named Mark Winsome and Egbert.97 Stephen Matterson explains that Melville 
satirized the transcendentalists on the grounds that “their spirituality masks an inherent 
materialism, and even a lack of charity.”98 The underlying implication of the Emersonian 
doctrine of the ‘self-reliant man,’ the idea that people must be fully responsible for their 
own well being in order to reach their full potential and to achieve ‘transcendence,’ is that 
being charitable to people actually does them a great disservice because it inhibits their 
self-reliance and stunts their spiritual growth.  
 Scholars continue to speculate on the identity of Melville’s characters from The 
Confidence-Man, identifying a wide range of public figures: Harrison Hayford sees Edgar 
Allen Poe in the “crazy beggar… peddling a rhapsodical tract” (CM, 230); Trimpi sees 
William Cullen Bryant, Theodore Parker, and Horace Greeley in the Man with the Weed, 
the Man in Gray, and the PIO Man, respectively; Egbert Oliver even identifies the now-
obscure actress and writer Fanny Kemble in the severely negative portrayal of Goneril.99 
Whether or not these identifications are true to Melville’s intentions is subject to 
continuing debate; however, such analyses establish that, from transcendentalism to 
religion to politics in the U.S., Melville saw hypocrisy and greed everywhere he looked.  
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 In a further challenge to humanist idealism, the confidence man and other 
passengers turn from the problem of motives to more practical concerns. Together they 
show that humanist faith, while understandable in abstract conceptions of humanity, is a 
liability and potentially a mortal error when applied to the practical world. Secular 
humanism is in this way susceptible to a reformulation of Ishmael’s ‘sage and sensible 
conclusion’ regarding religion, in which humanist ideals are one thing and the practical 
world another. In a crucial episode, one passenger tells of Colonel John Moredock, a 
frontiersman whom he describes as both a “good fellow at the bottom” and an “Indian-
hater” who was as “benevolent” to his (white) neighbor as he was “retributive in secret” 
against “Indians” (CM, 168-170). Despite this hatred, he nevertheless became “admired 
and loved” by his community (CM, 186). The confidence man is bewildered: “If the man 
of hate, how could John Moredock also be the man of love?” (CM, 187).  
 Anticipating this question, the passenger takes pains to establish that 
“backwoodsmen” and “Indians” have good reason to distrust each other on account of a 
history of violence, deceit, and broken treaties, and that such animosity has turned into 
hereditary racism between the groups (CM, 168-170). He also provides a psychological 
excuse for Moredock’s violent racism, explaining that “Indians” massacred his entire 
family and only then did he make genocidal vengeance his life’s passion (CM, 173-186). 
Having brought to light only one aspect of the ceaselessly violent history of humankind, 
the passenger concludes, “It is terrible that one creature should so regard another [and] 
should make it conscience to abhor an entire race… but is it surprising?” (CM, 175).  
 Reformulated, this question directly challenges the stated goals of secular 
humanism: How can one expect to unite humanity into a global community when all 
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aspects of human society and the entirety of human history prove this goal to be 
impossible? In speech, the confidence man is remarkably earnest, but like twentieth-
century secular humanists, he proclaims a fallacious view of humanity that is too 
abstracted from reality. Friedman calls this “the point of slippage between trust and 
distrust,” and says the confidence man occupies this point because he “relies on an image 
of humanity in the abstract that is to be trusted, and from this he derives his own 
trustworthiness.”100 Melville certainly possesses humanist inclinations, but he is not naïve 
enough to confuse his abstract and idealized vision of humanity with his perceptions of 
individuals and societies. His exploration of the problem of motives and the problem of 
practicability demonstrate his doubts about the philosophical justifications for such 
beliefs. Furthermore, Pierre and The Confidence-Man together expose his struggle with 
questions about the seemingly incomprehensible nature of morality itself—concerns that 
he despairingly finds unanswerable.  
The Dark Side of Idealism 
 Melville’s anxieties about morality are especially relevant in the context of 
secular humanism, which holds no claim to objective morality as intuitively authoritative 
as ‘divine command’ theory, yet wills its ideals to be treated as universal maxims.101 
Melville certainly seems to desire an objective foundation for morality, but as his 
examination of the ‘problem of motives’ shows, he recognizes that even universal 
maxims are corruptible when entrusted to human beings and can easily be appropriated to 
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mask subversive intentions. Melville’s moral concerns mirror his religious struggles, 
about which Hawthorne came to his famous conclusion, “He can neither believe, nor be 
comfortable in his unbelief; and he is too honest and courageous not to try to do one or 
the other.”102 This same trait manifests in Melville’s moral conscience as a struggle 
between what he wills himself to believe and yet cannot keep from doubting. 
 Melville may not succeed in finding a philosophically rigorous justification for 
his moral beliefs; nevertheless, he finds sufficient grounds to criticize the positions of 
others, as evidenced by his attacks on Unitarianism. In many ways, Pierre is an extended 
critique of Unitarianism, which is highly applicable to secular humanism. Herschel 
Parker summarizes Pierre as the story of a young idealist who learns that “what passed 
for Christianity in midcentury America, especially among socially prominent and wealthy 
Unitarians, was very far from Christlike.”103 John Seelye turns the spotlight on the 
protagonist himself, calling Pierre a “Unitarian clown” because his attempts to put into 
practice the “Christian necessity of charitable acts,” a major Unitarian ideal, only succeed 
in causing absurdly disproportionate misery and even death for himself and others.104 
Indeed, Pierre’s self-martyrdom is exaggerated, the consequences are overblown, and his 
death is melodramatic, especially considering his demise is sparked by something as 
seemingly benign as an ideal of Christian charity.  
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 The Church of the Apostles embodies Melville’s criticism of institutionalized 
humanism. The Apostles are very much like a Unitarian project in that they are a 
collection of impractical intellectuals described by Parker as “a range of crackpot 
reformers, all idealistic, all ill equipped to live in the real world,” all joined together 
under one church roof to espouse a relativist doctrine.105 Melville houses them in a 
repurposed old church, complete with irreverent restorations, such as a courtyard that had 
“usurped an unoccupied space formerly sacred as the old church’s burial enclosure” and a 
new edifice that looms over the church at the same height of the Church’s “sacred tower” 
(P, 266)—recalling the hubris of humans who built the Tower of Babel in an attempt to 
reach heaven.106 By housing the Apostles in this irreverent structure, Melville depicts 
Unitarianism as a theologically empty organization inhabiting the shell of Christianity, 
remarking, “When the substance is gone, men cling to the shadow” (P, 268).  
 For the Unitarians, the ‘substance’ of biblical certainty and the dogma of the 
trinity had been lost, but still they clung to ‘shadows’ of the bible as a vague source of 
inspiration and to Christ as a positive human role model. Other sects made this criticism 
against Unitarians for a number of their controversial theological positions: Unitarians 
denied the existence of the Trinity in favor of the ‘oneness of God,’ which for many 
entailed denying the divinity of Jesus Christ; they rejected the bible as the inspired word 
of God, finding it to be the product of human minds; they favored natural explanations 
over supernatural ones, even in regards to the origin of the universe; and they stressed the 
importance of reason and good works more than faith or baptism. Secular humanists 
                                                
 105 Herschel Parker, Herman Melville Vol. 2, 67. 
 
 106 Gen 11:1-9 (King James Bible) 
  63 
likewise jettisoned theological foundations for morality and truth, but still they clung to 
the shadows of religious rhetoric and to the cultural framework of Christianity.  
 Pierre too clings to shadows without substance. He is an idealist reformer of sorts, 
but after isolating himself in his room and turning his search for absolute truth into a 
project of self-discovery, he only succeeds in exposing his own emptiness. In perhaps the 
most scrutinized and celebrated passage in Pierre, the protagonist, having decided that 
the world is comprised of nothing but lies, finally turns his disappointed lens of idealism 
away from others to examine himself. Yet this excavation of the self leads him to a 
crushing conclusion about the human condition, encased in an archaeological metaphor: 
 The old mummy lies buried in cloth on cloth, it takes time to unwrap this 
 Egyptian king. […] By vast pains we mine into the pyramid, by horrible gropings 
 we come to the central room, with joy we espy the sarcophagus; but we lift the 
 lid—and no body is there!—appallingly vacant as vast is the soul of man! (P,  
 285) 
 
 In this passage, Pierre articulates his final disillusionment. Often interpreted in the 
context of Melville’s nihilism or, per John Carlos Rowe, as an “existential affirmation of 
the groundlessness of being,” the passage marks Pierre’s descent into the aforementioned 
‘dark side of idealism’—despair.107 Pierre succumbs to the ‘woe that is madness,’ 
thereafter declaring himself “the fool of Truth, the fool of Virtue, [and] the fool of Fate” 
(P, 358). As Ahab strikes at the white whale, believing it to be the sole obstacle between 
him and metaphysical truth, so Pierre lashes out at his cousin Glen, his first love and 
fiercest betrayer, finding him to be the embodiment of his disappointment with humanity. 
By murdering Glen, Pierre performs a final test of his moral agency, perpetrating an 
unquestionably un-Christlike act with an unambiguous broadcast of his wrathful motive: 
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“‘Tis speechless sweet to murder thee!” (P, 359). Thus, this act of violence is also 
Pierre’s last desperate act of truth. 
 But Pierre’s realization about the ‘vacancy’ of the human soul is not necessarily 
an outright declaration of nihilism or even soullessness on Melville’s part. Rowe, for one, 
argues that Pierre’s discovery does not indict humanity, but rather indicts transcendental 
idealism and its “absolutely elusive notion of the spirit or soul,” as well as the practice 
common among mystifying politicians and religious leaders to “mask illegitimate power” 
in the form of “supernatural authority.”108 Indeed, in the passages preceding, Melville 
leaves open the possibility for substance to be found in the aggregate of human souls, 
just as there is hope for truth, however vague, in the aggregate of human thought: “no one 
great book must ever be separately regarded… [but] all existing works must be 
federated… and so regarded as miscellaneous and pantheistic whole” (P, 284). This 
‘pantheistic whole,’ Melville finds, is still minute compared to “the latent infiniteness and 
inexhaustibility” within ourselves, and that “all great books in the world” are but shadows 
of “invisible and eternally unembodied images in the soul” (P, 284).  
 Thus, even in Pierre’s final disillusionment, Melville makes no positive claim that 
truth does not exist, nor that morality is not objective. Melville implies that truth, while 
vague and perhaps impossible to articulate, does exist and is present in the human soul, 
and that recognition of truth is possible only in the ‘pantheistic’ conglomeration of 
human seeking—a single spark of humanist idealism that withstands his oceanic doubt. 
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 Critics often accuse Melville of raising questions without providing any 
answers.109 In some cases, such as his metaphysical questions about the nature of God, 
this accusation rings true; nevertheless, Melville’s moral beliefs are not inscrutable. 
Melville never systematizes or proposes his own moral beliefs in any theoretically 
rigorous form in Moby Dick, Pierre, or The Confidence-Man, but his work demonstrates 
enough consistencies to articulate his position as well as his doubts. One can certainly 
identify numerous principles or virtues that Melville values, such as charity, community, 
toleration of religious and cultural difference, a degree of skepticism and critical thinking, 
balance and perspective, sincerity (as opposed to hypocrisy), and so on; however, he 
becomes increasingly pessimistic from one novel to the next about whether or not such 
virtues are even attainable or practicable. 
 Melville also identifies what he believes to be flawed approaches to moral 
questions. He exposes ‘virtuous expedience’ as a morally compromised and dissatisfying 
position in Pierre, and yet depicts the alternative, an idealist drive for ‘the absolute,’ to be 
unattainable and often irredeemably destructive. He shows that such absolutism, whether 
metaphysical or moral, is a guarantor of madness and self-destruction, exemplified by 
Ahab and Pierre, respectively. Melville, then, is reluctantly agnostic about the existence 
of objective or absolute moral truths that are also practicable in human life; nevertheless, 
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he desires for this objective morality to be the case, no matter how irreconcilable this 
desire is with his doubts or relativist inclinations.  
 How then might Melville answer the classical moral question of how we ought to 
live? Considering the range of characters presented in these three major novels of the 
1850s, Ishmael—though not entirely unproblematic—emerges as the best candidate for 
Melville’s answer. He is a person of faith, but is neither dogmatic nor hypocritical. He 
acts according to his moral principles, but permits himself to reassess those principles 
when they conflict with one another, guiding his decisions in such cases by exercising 
moral reasoning and acting according to whatever best reflects his empathy for others. He 
does not impose his moral expectations on the world, and instead remains relatively 
neutral and tolerant concerning the actions and beliefs of others. Furthermore, his 
morality is paired with adaptability, evidenced by his ability to cope with an existence in 
which some things are strictly unknowable, yet in which humans possess an innate desire 
to find the ultimate answers.  
 Metaphysically, Ishmael is a compatibilist who theorizes that free will operates on 
a narrow strand between necessity and chance. Epistemologically, he is skeptical of 
humankind’s ability to know the nature of truth, dismissing both empiricism and Platonic 
idealism and recognizing the inescapable subjectivity of human experience, but he is not 
so skeptical as to dismiss the possibility of truth entirely. In practice, he acts faithfully 
according to his own humanist principles and promotes human unity, but he holds no 
expectation that the rest of the world will follow suit. He opposes the religious and 
cultural homogenization project of evangelical missionaries, advocating instead for 
tolerance of other beliefs and ways of life. He questions the Emersonian doctrine of self-
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reliance and welcomes interdependence with Queequeg, recognizing that everyone is 
already interconnected in unseen ways. Finally, he respects that each of these categories 
are subject to a countless range of ambiguities, thus acknowledging the limits of human 
understanding and possibility. 
 This list of traits is remarkably similar to the core principles laid out in the 
Humanist Manifestos, such that it almost reads like a rough first draft. Before claiming 
Melville’s work unequivocally on behalf of secular humanism, however, one must admit 
to complications. Certainly this set of beliefs and ideals largely anticipates the course of 
secular humanism in the first half of the twentieth century, but Melville retains a certain 
degree of suspicion regarding a number of claims adopted by his successors and would 
likely object to the manner in which they institutionalized their beliefs.  
 First, while Melville continually expresses doubt in his work about the nature of 
God and about the ability of human beings to gain certain knowledge of the divine, he 
nevertheless operates on the positive assumption that God does indeed exist. This 
position clashes with later secular humanists who self-consciously severed all religious 
ties and began equating secularism with metaphysical naturalism—the belief that there 
are natural explanations for everything, and that supernatural things like gods and souls 
do not exist. However, Melville’s position is still compatible with the self-styled 
‘religious humanists’ who drafted the first Humanist Manifesto, seeking to free human 
morality from supernatural origins without dismissing divine possibilities altogether.  
 Secondly, Melville clashes with humanists who express full faith in the infinite 
potential of humankind and the possibility for utopian conditions on earth, who typically 
held a positive stance that humans have free will and are morally responsible for their 
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actions, and who believed that people are endowed with a moral inclination toward good 
regardless of the prevalence of evil in human life. Again, Melville seems to desire to 
believe such things about humanity, but he maintains that there are limits to human 
understanding, that free will is limited, and that the moral inclinations of humans tend 
toward corruption and enmity. Here, his viewpoint distinguishes him from the writers of 
the first Humanist Manifesto, but remains compatible with the later versions that account 
for the overwhelming problem of evil and the dangers of human progress. 
 Finally, Melville certainly would have regarded the institutionalization of secular 
humanism with suspicion, just as he criticized the operation of Unitarianism in New 
England. While secular humanism is often associated with ‘Freethought,’ cultural laissez-
faire, and moral relativism, it is also vulnerable to accusations of being just as dogmatic 
and closed-minded as its religious analogues.110 Peña confirms, “Melville was particularly 
critical of religious institutions and representatives who hypocritically promoted 
brotherhood and devotion by actually imposing dogma and neutralizing free thinking.”111 
Such charges against Unitarians are also applicable in the case of institutionalized secular 
humanism. “If Unitarianism ever fails to be fruitful,” Unitarian Charles A. Allen 
cautioned in 1908, “the cause is to be found in its becoming… a dogma that has no 
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spiritual truth.”112 Surely Melville would have taken the early twentieth-century secular 
humanists’ dogmatic approach to be a point deserving of criticism.   
 So why did Melville remain a member of the Unitarian church for so many years? 
All Souls’ minister emeritus (and Melville scholar) Walter Kring claims that in joining 
the Unitarian church, Melville “bound himself to no hierarchy, no creed, Christian or 
otherwise. He simply agreed to search for the truth and to adopt whatever he believed to 
be the truth for his own use.”113 For Melville, then, the lack of theological substance may 
have been a necessary concession to make in order to benefit from the Unitarians’ 
message of humanism, rationalist exegesis of scripture, and willingness to depart from 
religious tradition while still operating in a spiritual framework. 
 Melville’s thought is therefore not typical of secular humanism; however, it is 
clearly prototypical of the secular humanist ideology. The same anxieties, doubts, and 
disillusionment of Melville reappear in the passions of secular humanists who reacted 
against religious hypocrisy, against resistance to new scientific knowledge, against 
defamations of human nature as ‘fallen,’ and against the cultural conservatism under 
which social progress seemed stifled or stalled. The same values, beliefs, and ideals that 
Melville strives to embody and understand in his work also anticipate the course of 
secular humanism, which organized above all as a means to realize the highest possible 
forms of human life, to bring individuals and society closer to reaching their full 
potential, and to transcend cultural barriers to unite humankind into a global community: 
a ‘great and everlasting First Congregation of this whole worshipping world.’  
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